Abstract

This paper focuses specifically on terrorism in India, with particular reference to Kashmir insurgency and the Naxalite (Maoist) movement, examining the structural, political and socio-economic factors that contributed to the emergence of these insurgent groups. 

The study is further situated within two principal theoretical lenses identified by Jeff Goodwin: the traditional perspective, which conceptualizes terrorism as a “weapon of the weak”, and the radicalization perspective. In addition, the paper critically reviews the work of prominent scholars whose analysis highlights diverse motivational factors. 

Building on this framework, it also identifies and analyses the principal causes underlying the Kashmir insurgency, highlighting political marginalization, cross-border influence, identity-based grievances, the legacy of the unresolved 1947 Partition dispute, and the impact of Hindutva politics have shaped the trajectory of conflict in the region. 

Extending this analysis, the paper examines the Naxalite Movement (Maoist) movement, tracing its roots to socio-economic inequalities, agrarian exploitation and the persistent marginalization of tribal communities, alongside the ideological influence of contested claims regarding external (particularly Chinese) involvement.

However, in reference to the Kashmir insurgency and the Naxalite (Maoist) movement, Terrorism in India cannot be narrowly confined to religious extremism alone. Rather, it must be understood as the outcome of intersecting structural, ideological and political factors. India’s complex geopolitical location and its history entrenched conflicts have further vulnerabilities in the internal security framework. In light of these findings, it’s important for the enforcement of inclusive governance, credible institutions and sustained socio-economic development to address root causes that perpetuate conflict and instability instead of militarization. 

1. Introduction

What are the causes and consequences of terrorism in India with reference to the Kashmir insurgency and Naxalite movement today? India, like many other countries around the world, has suffered several terrorist attacks over the last two decades. In this research paper, I aim to explore some of the factors that contribute to the rise of terrorism, and to examine its consequences on domestic politics and foreign relations. 

Terrorism has emerged as one of the most persistent and complex challenges in contemporary states, particularly in developing democracies such as India. Several studies identify socio-economic disparities, political exclusion, regional imbalances and perceived injustice as certain factors contributing to the emergence of terrorism. In this model, terrorism is often conceptualized not merely as indiscriminate violence, but as a strategic instrument employed by non-state actors.

Two prominent theoretical perspectives can help in contextualizing the phenomenon. The traditional view portrays terrorism as the “weapon of the weak”, suggesting that downtrodden groups resort to asymmetric violence and in contrast, the radical perspective interprets terrorisms as part of a wider process of escalating political violence, where ideological mobilization, identity-based politics and structured inequalities over the time.

This study points out two major challenges that have continued to shape India’s territorial security landscape: the Kashmir conflict and the Naxalite (left wing extremist) movement. The Kashmir issue represents a multifaceted conflict rooted in historical disputes, regional aspirations and cross-border interactions. Motivations which link to terrorism in this region include separatist aspirations, the influence of global jihadist movement, ideological divergences, perceived political marginalization, etc.

Arising from the 1960s in Naxalbari village of West Bengal, the Naxalite movement reflects a different but also an important form of political violence. Emerging from a radical communist ideology, the movement initially mobilized marginalized rural populations around issues of land redistribution, class exploitation and state neglect

By examining these two cases, this paper seeks to address our central research question: What are the principal causes of terrorism in India? Through a critical analysis of structural conditions, ideological motivations and state responses, the study aims to contribute to an understanding of terrorism as a product of intersecting political, economic and identity-centric factors. This study examines these two cases and offers policy recommendations. 

2. Defining Terrorism

It is important first to define the concept of “terrorism” before addressing my main research question. Terrorism is a highly contested term, and there is no common argument among the scholars on how to define it. However, the purposes of this paper, is to define terrorism in line with Goodwin (2019): “any tactic or set of tactics used by any government, group, organization, or individual, in pursuit of a political goal (broadly defined), which is intended to kill or harm civilians or noncombatants (as opposed to soldiers or political leaders) so as to frighten, intimidate, demoralize, provoke, or pressure other civilians and/or political leaders.” In short, this definition prioritizes that terrorism is primarily about the harming of civilians in order to intimidate others for political ends.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW: CAUSES OF TERRORISM

The section reviews literature on the causes of terrorism, highlighting two major arguments: one links to individual factors like religious fundamentalism and psychological traits while other traces to political marginalization and socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions. 

3.1 Individual-Level Explanations: Ideology and Psychology

To start with the first argument, older literature tends to emphasize that terrorists- were motivated by ideology, psychological predispositions, or religious fundamentalism (especially Islamic fundamentalism) (Pape 2003; Kramer 1990; Merari 1990; Post 1990). 

However, Pape (2003) argues that modern day terrorist attacks have not just limited to religious fundamentalists or to isolated men with certain psychological variations, but he gives the example of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), a group which recruited individuals who were Hindu Tamils but who were inclined towards Marxist ideology.

3.2 Structural and Political Explanations

The second type of argument focuses on some social grievances for example: political – and not religious, or individual psychological – motives of the terrorists. It has highlighted the motives i.e., to achieve specific political motives, change the policies in favour of them, to get financial backing (Crenshaw 2012; Abrahms 2008; Goodwin 2019). Crenshaw (2012) argues that violent acts are intentional political and strategic choices, rather than the inevitable result of social or psychological factors. In her view, terrorism functions as a “weapon of the weak,” used by actors who lack conventional means to influence government policy. Groups such as Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland have used violence to pursue ethnic and religious rights Abrahms (2008) similarly argues that terrorism is the last and only resort for some groups to achieve their political goals.

Although the act of suicide terrorism might be irrational on an individual level. Thomas Schelling (1996) may have called it “the rationality of irrationality” – that is, the individual dies but the group is able to strategically demonstrate to the audience that it is serious about its political goals (Pape 2003). Terrorist groups are more likely to use suicide terrorism when there is a possibility of changing public opinion in favour them (i.e., in democracies). In the words of Boix and Rosato (2001): “The target state of every modern suicide campaign has been a democracy. The United States, France, Israel, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia were all democracies when they were attacked by suicide terrorist campaigns, even though the last three became democracies more recently than the others.” Crenshaw (2012) similarly argues that terrorists do not just target communist regimes, but also target democracies.

Terrorism is closely linked to social and political conditions that create exclusions and injustice, which can be explained by some contextual examples on socio-political grievances. For example, when a minority group feels isolated in their own homeland, it forces them to retaliate or harm the civilians of their own nation or others. To make it clearer, we can take the example of attacks on Muslim community in India whether in Kashmir, Ayodhya or Godra Kand, which scorn the wounds of the neighbouring states which led to 26/11.  In short, historical rifts are also the causes which never cure the wounds of the nation. 

According to Edward Newman (2006) “These conditions-such as poverty, demographic factors, social inequality and exclusion, dispossession, and political grievances can be either permissive or direct.” This shows how terrorism is directly linked with environmental factors which degenerates the equality, rights and dignity of a human being. Ongoing social inequality and exclusion contribute to perception of injustice, while political grievances and dispossession weaken trust in state institutions. 

Furthermore, Terrorism is closely linked with the failures of human securities which can be understood as a consequence of insecurity and modernization where marginalized individuals resort to violence due to lack of opportunities and social breakdown for which O’Neill (2002) says, “human insecurity, broadly understood, provides the enabling conditions for terrorism to flourish”. As a result, insecurity of a human leads to its action which might harm the community. Also, terrorism is considered as the last resort to accomplish their needs and desires when peaceful methods don’t pay off. To understand with a few examples: Afghanistan, Sudan, Algeria, Yemen, Georgia, Pakistan. Somalia- which are the fundamental core of the operations conducted by the groups all over the world because of poverty.

In accordance with earlier explanations, this perspective offers a different account of the causes of terrorism. As per Martha Crenshaw (2012), she firstly makes a point on Modernization which creates a link between the individuals via easy transportations and communications.   Urbanization is one of the best tools which comes under modernization, as it increases the number of mobility and accessibility of targets and methods, which she termed as “urban guerilla warfare”, which was seen in Latin America in the 1960s.

This approach indicates that terrorism is not just driven by ideology or political grievances but is also shaped by structural transformations in society. Processes such as modernization and urbanization create environments that increase connectivity, mobility and the concentration of targets, thereby making terrorist strategies more feasible. 

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical framework explain terrorism through two perspectives- first is Traditional theory, finds terrorism as “the product of weakness and/or desperation of some rebel or state (a ‘weapon of the weak’)” when there is a lack of capacity in pressurizing their opponent by their non-violent or conventional acts. The second, The Radicalization Perspective, which believes that “not all radicals may be terrorists, but all terrorists are radicals”. Radicalization is understood as “a process leading towards increased use of political violence”. Both theories ultimately points to a common goal i.e. Political motives. (Jeff Goodwin, 2019). Together, these perspectives indicate that terrorism is not merely a tactical choice but also a political constructed strategy shaped by both opportunities. 

5. INDIAN TERRORISM LANDSCAPES

This section focuses on the insurgencies faced by India.  India is a secular and multicultural nation. Since 1947, conflicts with Pakistan have led to wars. The Kashmir dispute emerged after the 1947 Instrument of Accession, leading to prolonged conflict between India and Pakistan. But India is not just facing such insurgencies by Pakistan, internal insurgencies continue which harm the peace and harmony of the nation. Apart from Kashmir related issues there is another big issue, i.e. The Naxalite or Maoist movement began in 1969 in Naxalbari and spread across states.

5.1 On Kashmir Conflict

Historical Background

The Kashmir dispute emerged during the 1947 partition of British India. Princely states were permitted to join either country. Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, had a Muslim-majority population but was governed by a Hindu ruler who initially attempted to remain independent. In October 1947, tribal fighters from Pakistan entered the region, prompting the Maharaja to seek military assistance from India, leading to the first war between India and Pakistan. This conflict was referred to the United Nations, which called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow Kashmir to determine their future. Unfortunately, the plebiscite was never conducted and the region was divided. In Curfewed Night, Basharat Peer presents this history as lived trauma. The memoir briefly outlines the unfulfilled promise of self-determination. Rather than analysing diplomatic negotiations, the book highlights how unresolved political conflict translated into militarization, curfews and insecurities in the Kashmir Valley. Having outlined the historical foundations of the dispute, the discussion now moves to the factors that have shaped the rise and continuity of militant violence in Kashmir. 

Drivers of the Kashmir insurgency

Many possible motives can be drawn for attacks in India, which is provided by K. Alan. Kronstadt (2008, pg. 6), according to some reports, radical Islamic sentiments play a crucial role, as radicals wanted a certain revenge for their Indian Muslim community in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh- 1992 and at Godra, Gujarat- 2002. And it is known that the radicals were inspired by Al-Queda’s brand of global jihadi ideology.  Some views indicate LeT has aimed for Kashmir’s separatism as their primary goal.  The Kashmir problem is related to the state’s claim by which state, which was very clearly demarcated since 1947. By military, Line of Control separated Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan which controlled Azad Kashmir. Secretary Rice has speculated that the goal of the attackers was “probably to stir up trouble between Pakistan and India.” 

Terrorism violence in India cannot be explained by a single ideology; it results from the interaction of religious radicalization, geopolitical rivalries and unresolved territorial disputes. The Kashmir conflict and India-Pakistan tensions provide a strategic environment where extremist groups try to internationalize the issue and escalation between the two states. Thus, terrorism also functions as a strategic tool to influence regional politics.

In line with Shivaji Khemnar (2018), there are ethno-nationalist terrorism, religious terrorism, left wing terrorism, Narco terrorism. Roots of massive terrorism in India, are various in ideology, poverty, regional imbalance, strong worship about religion. India suffers attacks from Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. 

Following this, Vani. K. Borooah (December 2008), provided some factual data of the attacks held in Kashmir. Over the period of 1998-2004, 784 terrorist incidents in India which resulted in 3008 deaths, and 61% of them and 55% of casualties occurred in Jammu and Kashmir alone. Apart from native-born terrorism, Kashmir conflict has attracted Al-Qaeda who have viewed this as a large part of Islamic strategy. A pamphlet titled “Why are we waging jihad” by Lashkar-e-Taiba includes the spread Islam in every corner of India. (Haleen 2004; Borooah 2008). Islamist groups were responsible for 126 attacks out of which 12 were suicidal attacks, out of which 6 were by Lashkar-e-Taiba, 2 were by Al-Mansurian (LeT) and 2 were by Jaish-e-Mohammad.

This is important statistical evidence which shows the concentration of terrorist incidents in J&K, the analysis largely focuses on quantitative data and military group involvement. Hence, the data highlights the scale and external linkages of terrorism. 

The Kashmir revolt is traced from the middle class and their frustration as it lacks employment opportunities (Sumit Ganguly; Prem Shankar Jha). Why do democratic political systems tend to experience higher incidents of terrorist attacks? 

It is explained in the lines “The growth of political assertiveness of minority communities in democratic states is virtually inevitable. As minorities acquire increased literacy and education, they will become more conscious of their political rights and will seek to assert them. Nondemocratic, poly-ethnic states can suppress minority demands for political participation through co-optation, coercion, or repression.” (Sumit Ganguly, 1996). 

Hence, this argument can be interpreted as rising awareness and mobilization especially among educated minorities– can create pressures that political institutions struggle to manage. However, this explanation may overemphasize political participation as a cause of terrorism, while underestimating other factors such as regional, external support to militant groups and state responses. Thus, democratic openness may create space for dissent, but it does not necessarily make democratic the only and primary cause for terrorism. 

Terrorism cannot be explained solely in terms of social and political factors; rather politics plays a crucial role in shaping and concealing issues that are deliberately prevented from being revealed. In Kashmir there are 3-way perspectival divisions: Hindus in Jammu, Buddhist in Ladakh and Muslims in Kashmir and it has created a paradigm that Kashmir is Muslim and is Anti-National. It gives a reflection of the Kashmiris struggle “against India’s brutalities”, where they were illegally detained, tortured, imprisoned and exploited. 

Under the governance of NDA, ideology of Hindutva was followed and spread in Kashmir without considering Muslims in Kashmir, which has resulted in the rise of attack frequency.

Hindutva-driven political strategies have indirectly increased tensions in Kashmir by making many Muslims feel excluded and unheard. Debates around Article 370 and 35A, along with efforts to fully integrate the region have added to this feeling of insecurity. At the same time, the growing support between Hindu nationalist groups and some Kashmiri Pandits has deepened divisions. These tensions and grievances are used by militant groups, which keep the cycle of conflict and violence going. (Mridu Rai, 2019)

Her focus is on political narratives, identity politics, and ideological agendas- particularly debates around Article 370 and 35A- which has shaped perspectives of marginalization in Kashmir. However, this argument primarily emphasizes the role of Bhartiya Janta Party and Hindutva politics. Nevertheless, political factors play a significant role, since politics shapes governance and national decisions-making which remains crucial in understanding terrorism and instability. 

The BJP’s Kashmir Policy: Continuity and Change from Vajpayee to Modi

While the Kashmir conflict is often explained through historical, social and security-related factors, political dynamics also constitute a significant dimension, as political parties frequently shape policies and narratives in alignment with their ideological orientations and strategic interests. 

In line with Mridu Rai (2019) there are 2 eras of the BJP government, which depicts the conditions in the Kashmir valley since the 1990s. According to the report, since 1990 Kashmir has experienced less governance in the conventional sense and more population control enforced through fear and violence. The passage further argues that the Indian state under the Modi government has intensified this security-oriented approach, framing it within the ideological vision of the Hindu Rashtra.

It presents a comparative analysis of the BJP under Atal Bihari Vajpayee and under Narendra Modi, particularly in relation to Kashmir and Pakistan. It suggests that Vajpayee’s tenure represented a relatively peaceful phase in India’s Kashmir policy. Vajpayee included this approach in the slogan “Insaaniyat, Jamhooriyat aur Kashmiriyat”, signalling a framework attached with humanity, democratic process and recognition of Kashmir identity.

In contrast, the Modi government has described as adopting a more assertive and militarised way toward Pakistan. Public celebration of “surgical strikes” and repeated warnings of retaliations show increased aggression. This external posture is said to be mirrored internally in Kashmir, where stronger security measures have been justified in the name of countering cross-border terrorism. 

 It argues that organisationally, the BJP has undergone significant transformation since 2014. While centralized under Vajpayee, but more monolithic under Modi’s leadership, with reduced space for internal dissent and increased subordination of regional leadership to central command. Since 2014, the author suggests, incidents of hostility and violence against such groups have been more visible. 

Cross-border Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir

Numerous attacks in Kashmir are observed, like Mumbai Train Blast (2006), Mumbai Attack 26/11(2008), Mumbai Bombing (2011), Pathankot Airbase Attack (2016), Uri Attack (2016), Pulwama Attack (2019), Bengaluru Attack (2023), Pahalgam Attack (2025). 

The most recent Pahalgam attack (22nd April 2025), which resulted in the death of 27 security personnel and injury to over 40 civilians (Adil, Sohail & Farid, 2025).  Pahalgam was a core of tourism along with the transit point for Annual Amarnath Yatra pilgrimage, which was then considered as the attack on for both its scale and its symbolism. By the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, Pakistan’s military group Lashkar-e-Taiba was accused of this insurgency. (Tanveer, 2025). This time India retaliated with fearlessness by its operation named “Operation Sindoor” on 7 May 2025.

The paragraph concludes with the call of, that Kashmir has been called by Arundhati Roy, a ‘real theatre of unspeakable violence and moral corrosion.’ (Muhammad Feyyaz 2019). Geopolitics plays a significant role with all events happening in and around the world. Geography is what stabilizes or destabilizes a nation’s security and development. Pakistan’s desire to cover Kashmir in its territory is not just in the interest of Islamic fundamentalism, instead, its geographical, hydrological and strategic factors. It is important for Pakistan to maintain a powerful position in Kashmir, essentially for water security and advantageous position against India.  

Repercussions of Armed insurgency

Since 1947, this prolonged conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has had wide- ranging impacts beyond security. It has led to environmental damage, economic decline (majorly tourism), has disrupted education and regular life, along with serious mental health issues as per Dr. Mushaq Margoob, Professor & Head, Post Graduate Department of Psychiatry, Government Medical College, Srinagar. Taken together, these have weakened the region’s social and economic stability. Overall, terrorism has deeply affected Kashmir’s development and the life-style of the people. 

5.2 THE NAXALITE (Maoist) MOVEMENT

Historical Background and Origins

After examining the conflict in Kashmir, it is equally important to turn to another major internal security challenge persisting in India–the Naxalite Movement. The Naxalite movement, also known as Maoist insurgency in India, originated in 1967 in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal as a radical peasant uprising against those land inequalities and exploitative agrarian structures. Inspired by Maoist ideology and the principles of the armed revolution, the movement sought to challenge what is known as a semi-feudal and oppressive state system. The movement was ideologically influenced by revolutionary doctrine linked with Mao Zedong and political development in China during the 1960s. However, this was largely evolved as a domestically rooted response to socio-economic inequalities, tribal marginalization and governance deficit within India. Initially driven by demands for land redistribution and social justice for marginalized communities–which then gradually expanded into the central and eastern parts of Indian states, forming what is often referred to as the “Red Corridor”. Over the period of time, the movement evolved from localized agrarian resistance into an organized armed insurgency. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence studies and Analysis (2010) states that the Naxalite movement was driven by radical Marxist- Leninist ideology which led to the formation of the CPI (M-L). Multiple internal challenges seen in: the Central-Eastern area (Red Corridor), North-East India by groups like NSCN & ULFA. (Aditya Dasgupta, Kishor Gawande and Devesh Kapoor; 2017)

Understanding the structural and immediate causes that helps in the emergence and persistence of this movement becomes essential to comprehend its relevance in India’s internal security landscapes. 

Structural and Socio-Economic Determinants

In 2008, Prime Minister-Manmohan Singh described Naxalism as “the greatest threat to our internal security”. The pace of the Naxalite movement suggests not merely state incapacity, but deeper structural contradiction within India’s developmental model, has been the driving force to such insurgent acts. While the Indian state pursued parliamentary democracy and economic modernization, large parts of rural and tribal populations remained excluded from land reforms, political representation, and access to justice. 

In line with European Foundation for South Asian Studies Publications: Naxalbari, the village that gave its name to the movement, was the site of the peasant revolt, started by communist leaders against owners of the state. The Naxalbari uprising was not a mere reason for agrarian anger but an ideological rupture within Indian communism. It marked a rejection of parliamentary gradualism and signalled the re-emergence of revolutionary violence as a legitimate political instrument among sections of the left. Members of Communist Party of India (Maoist), notably Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal who initiated this movement. Drawing inspiration from Maoist ideology, these leaders advocated a strategy of long armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the existing socio-economic order through agrarian revolution. The uprising reflected a vision articulated by the so-called “Siliguri Group”, which called for a militant path to political transformation. The formation of CPI in 1925 institutionalized communist ideology in India drawing inspiration from the global Marxist-Leninist movements and adapting them to the colonial Indian context. In its early years, the CPI was committed to a Marxist-inspired mass revolution but later faced internal and external pressures that reshaped its strategy. In 1951, after consultations with Stalin- who advised participation in democratic politics rather than armed revolt–the CPI reconsidered its revolutionary path. The ideological reshaping laid the groundwork for subsequent fractions within the left movement ultimately which contributed to the emergence of radical Maoist. Disillusionment with the CPI’s gradual and pro-soviet orientation- particularly its commitment to parliamentary democracy and perceived abandonment of revolutionary militancy–led to the break away at the Seventh Party Congress in Calcutta. The CPI-M thus emerged as a distinct political formation that rejected what it characterized as soviet “revisionism” and aimed to reaffirm a more orthodox and militant Marxist line, drawing ideological inspiration from the Chinese Communist model. 

Naxalite emerged as a radical response to deep rooted socio-economic inequalities. Its primary causes according to Sanjay Seth (1995), were as follows: The very first is, Structural Contradictions of Capitalist Development- Capitalist expansion generates contradictions between socialized productionand private appropriation leading to crises which intensify exploitation and weaken legitimacy, creating conditions for resistance.Second is seen as the Formation and Organization of the Proletariat- capitalist modernization concentrates workers in the factories and cities, fostering class solidarity and collective resistance and also creates a basis for revolutionary mobilization. Moving forward, Marxist Reorientation towards Peasant Agency in ‘Backward’ Societies- Marxist revolutionary theory shifts emphasis to peasant agency in backward societies, viewing peasant struggles against feudalism as a key driver for revolutionary change.Along with that Gap between Consciousness and Marxist Political Objectives- Peasant resistance, shaped by local and traditional identities, which differ from Marxist class ideology, creating a gap that leads to ideological tensions. In addition to the initial factors, Misrecognition of Peasant Subjectively by Communist Parties- where communist parties misread peasant consciousness, projecting revolutionary intent, leading to a strategic and ideological disconnect. And last but not the least, Instrumentalization of Peasant Struggles by Vanguard Parties- communist parties often used peasant struggles for their own goals, directing movements beyond peasants’ intent, leading to dissatisfaction.

While Sanjay Seth highlights contradictions between peasant consciousness and Marxist political objectives, the Naxalite movement demonstrates how ideology and lived experience interact dynamically rather than mechanically. Peasant resistance in India was not purely “false consciousness” nor fully revolutionary; rather, it evolved through local grievances–land alignment, state repression and caste hierarchies–that were gradually reframed within Maoist political language. Thus, the movement’s radicalization can be understood as a process of ideological translation.  

It follows that the persistence of Naxalite exposes the gap between India’s procedural democracy and substantive socio-economic justice, particularly in marginalized regions such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Governance failures, extractive development and weak reforms lead the insurgent appeal, framing it as internal security issues. The growth of Naxalism reflects deeper structural inequalities in India’s development model rather than only a security issue.              

Integrated approaches to mitigate Naxalite insurgency

Although the Naxalite insurgency has emerged from the multiple structural and socio-economic causes discussed above, the Indian government has also introduced several strategies to mitigate the movement. In line with Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (April, 2010) The Government of India, has adopted a two-pronged strategy, to address Naxalism, combining security measures and governance interventions.The government set up an Empowered Group of Ministers, a Coordination Centre, and a special task force to improve coordination. It focused on a Law-and-Order Approach through police modernization and long-term deployment of centre forces, with the centre bearing costs (around  ₹1,100 crore) to support states. Another approach the government adopted is Social Integration Approach, focusing on development through schemes like the Backward District initiative and BRGF, allocating funds to affected areas. It also implemented state-level support and infrastructure programs like PMGSY to improve living conditions and reduce Naxal influence. 

Sino- Maoist connections

After examining the internal causes and state responses to Naxalite insurgency, it also becomes important to assess whether external factors contribute to these insurgent activities. This analysis helps determine whether policy responses should extend beyond domestic measures to include broader strategic and foreign policy considerations. 

There are two principal stands of argument, one contends that China has no involvement with Naxalite or Maoist movement in India, while the other claims that China bears responsibility for supporting or facilitating these insurgencies.

First argument notes, Maoist groups’ linkages with militant, Northeast insurgent, and radical Islamist organizations for logistical support pose a significant internal security challenge to India, while multiple factors suggest Chinese involvement in sustaining Left-Wing Extremism (LWE). An analysis by the Vivekanand International Foundation quotes The Home Secretary, G.K.Pillai in November 2009, where he was confident with the supply chains of arms by China to Maoists in India, “Chinese are big smugglers and suppliers of small arms. I am sure that the Maoists also get them.”

The Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, acknowledged that Naxalites procure weapons through cross-border routes via Nepal, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, but expressed uncertainty regarding any direct assistance from Chinese state actors. Nevertheless, repeatedly Chinese made arms and communication equipment from Maoist cadres are often cited as indicative of possible linkages between Maoist groups and China. 

To line RSN Singh (2010), the Home Secretary has asserted that China is a major supplier of small arms and suggested that Maoist Groups may procure weapons of Chinese origin. In 2004, a significant supply of light and medium machine guns and ammunition were seized at Chittagong port in Bangladesh, reportedly sourced from China. Bangladesh intelligence officials further alleged that leaders of United Liberation Front of Asom and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) visited Kunming to obtain arms, some of which were allegedly routed to Maoist groups operating in Nepal and India. 

Second, it argues that China has nothing to do with any insurgency, according to the statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (May 17, 2012) that India raised concerns with China regarding reported support for anti-India armed groups, prompting China to assure a policy of non-interference and deny such support. China has officially denied supporting anti-government forces and emphasized its policy of non-interference; the dialogue mechanism indicates that India remains cautious and will continue to monitor dimensions of internal threats.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the study demonstrates that terrorism is a complex and evolving phenomenon that cannot be understood through a single framework. The discussion of various scholarly definitions, theoretical perspectives and the examination of cases such as Kashmir and Naxalite illustrate that terrorism emerges from the interaction of ideological, political, socio-economic, and historical factors, earlier, terrorism was often narrowly associated with religious extremism; however, contemporary conflicts increasingly reveal an overlap between terrorism and civil wars. This growing convergence has created distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence, consequently, the absence of a universally accepted and precise definition of terrorism continues to challenge the international community in formulating consistent responses.

From the Indian perspective, geography plays a dual role. While India’s geographical position has historically facilitated cultural exchange, economic interaction and strategic connectivity. It has also exposed the country to security vulnerabilities and cross-border tension. In addition to these historical and geographical factors, ideological influences have also shaped certain forms of insurgency in India. The influence of socialism and communalism, particularly in regions characterized by socio-economic disparities and governance gaps, has contributed to the emergence of structural grievances, including poverty, land alienation and the neglect of marginalized communities. 

The findings of this research suggest that addressing terrorism requires a multidimensional approach. While security measures remain important, long term solutions must also focus on ensuring inclusive development for all sections of society. Future research should therefore explore innovative perspectives that move beyond purely historical explanations and instead examine how structural reforms, effective governance and socio-economic justice can help mitigate the conditions that sustain violent movements. 

Although the complete eradication of terrorism may be unrealistic, meaningful progress can still be achieved through stronger international cooperation, stricter accountability for states that have terrorist networks, and institutional reforms. Finally, the persistence of terrorism highlights not only individual responsibility but also government failures. When the government is unable or unwilling to address citizens’ aspirations and grievances, extremist ideologies find space to grow. In this context, terrorism may be defined as “a strategic and radical practice aimed at influencing state policy through coercion or violence.” 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express their sincere gratitude to Dr. Mashail Malik, Assistant Professor, Harvard University for her invaluable guidance, intellectual support, and constant encouragement throughout this research. I also thank her for the insightful discussions and helpful feedback on the initial drafts of this manuscript.

I am grateful to the Department of Political Science at Banasthali Vidyapith for providing the necessary institutional resources to conduct this study.

On a personal note, I wish to thank my parents and friends for their unwavering moral support, patience, and encouragement during the course of this work. Their belief in my efforts was a constant source of motivation.

Finally, I thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions, which significantly contributed to improving the quality of this paper.

About the author

Disha Tyagi

Disha Tyagi is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science from Banasthali Vidyapith. Her academic interests revolve around International Relations, South Asian regionalism, geopolitics, diplomacy, public policy, global governance, trade relations, conflict studies, security studies, and international cooperation. Among these, terrorism and regional instability remain one of her strongest areas of interest and research. She is particularly interested in studying how terrorism impacts regional integration and development, especially in areas such as Kashmir and Left-Wing Extremism in India.

Her academic journey has been enriched through active participation in seminars, conferences, webinars, debates, and international academic engagements. She attended the BRICS International School: New Generation in March 2026 and participated in the Global Studies Program organized by the Russian Federal University in February 2026. She also attended the seminar on “WTO MC14 Outcomes: Future of Multilateralism and Implications on India’s Trade Agenda” held on 5 May 2026, which deepened her understanding of trade diplomacy and multilateral institutions. Additionally, she participated in webinars such as “The Structural Causes of World Poverty” by Thomas Pogge on 23 April 2026 and “India’s BRICS Presidency 2026” by Antara Ghosal Singh on 8 May 2026. These academic interactions enhanced her understanding of global justice, development politics, and emerging geopolitical transformations.

Beyond academics, she has actively participated in Model United Nations and parliamentary simulations, including the Youth Parliament (UNGA Portfolio) held during SANSAD 2025 in Delhi. She has also completed online courses including “Successful Negotiation: Essential Strategies and Skills” by the University of Michigan, “Learning How to Learn” by the University of Arizona, and “Writing in the Sciences” from Stanford University, along with an offline communication course at the British Council, Delhi.

The post From Global Causes to Local Realities: Terrorism in India with Reference to Kashmir and the Naxalite Movement appeared first on Exploratio Journal.

Abstract:

Numerous studies have been conducted regarding the outcomes of COVID-19 on the world healthcare system, the global economy, and on mental health, as well as what epidemiological factors contributed to the spread of the virus. However, little research has been completed to analyze other factors that helped the disease thrive, beyond the characteristics of the virus itself, and where society stands today as it prepares for a possible future epidemic.  

The objective of this paper is to critically analyze the primary body that was tasked with controlling a pandemic – the World Health Organization (WHO) – and the measures they put in place – The International Health Regulations (IHR) – to manage the risk of an event like COVID-19. More specifically, through case studies and examples drawn from the pandemic response efforts, along with directional input from a former staff member of the WHO, the research will dig into what non-biological aspects contributed to the spread of the virus, what steps have been taken by the WHO since, and what potential gaps still exist today.

By advocating for improved international public health collaboration and concerted efforts to enhance pandemic preparedness, this research contributes to the intellectual discourse on mechanisms to help ensure a more-resilient response to future global health threats in an increasingly interconnected world.

Keywords: COVID-19, WHO, IHR, IHR 2005, PHEIC

I. Introduction

Founded in 1948, the World Health Organization (WHO) is a United Nations agency of 194 member states that is tasked with promoting health on a global scale. Because a key element of its charter is to help prevent the spread of serious public health threats beyond a country’s borders, the WHO later established the International Health Regulations (IHR) to more effectively control specific highly contagious diseases. These regulations have been updated multiple times since their adoption in 1969, including important changes contained in a revision called IHR 2005, to deliver even better protection worldwide.

Despite the WHO’s efforts to put a foundation in place for effectively addressing a pandemic (with the IHR and its amendments), COVID-19 exposed serious gaps in global preparedness. A lack of transparency and sharing of information across countries underscored the need for quicker identification and collaboration worldwide. Clear differences in how member states reacted once a pandemic was declared highlighted the need for more consistent reporting and response. And considerable differences in the containment strategies used by these countries to slow the spread of the disease, both inside and outside their borders, shined a light on the inadequacies of the existing regulations.

In the years following the deadly outbreak, countries have banded together to revise and update the IHR even more. In June 2024, additional amendments were announced, which included a clearer definition of a pandemic emergency and a more-effective way to declare one. Member states also made a recommitment to solidarity and equity, and they agreed to better share resources in the future to prevent (and collectively respond to) similar outbreaks.

This paper aims to better understand the shortfalls of IHR 2005 – the version of the regulations in place at the time of the COVID-19 outbreak – that led to less-than-ideal responses. It will also evaluate the potential effectiveness of the most recent 2024 amendments and identify possible roadblocks to success in addressing a future public health threat of a similar magnitude, as well as offer suggestions for better future pandemic management.

II. Overview of COVID-19 and the Role of IHR

A. Background on COVID-19

COVID-19, was caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, a novel coronavirus that is part of a family of viruses that includes those responsible for the common cold, as well as more severe illnesses like SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). Coronaviruses are characterized by crown-like spikes on their surface, which helps them attach to host cells. Genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 revealed it to be closely related to coronaviruses found in bats. It also shares similarities with the virus responsible for SARS, suggesting (although disputed) that it may have originated in bats and then jumped to humans, possibly through an intermediary host, which is a phenomenon known as zoonotic spillover. (Lora, 2021). 

COVID-19 reportedly first emerged in December 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. The initial cases were linked to a seafood market in Wuhan, which also sold live wild animals. By January 2020, COVID-19 cases were spreading rapidly in Wuhan, leading to the imposition of localized lockdowns and travel restrictions. (History, 2023). Due to its many transmission methods the disease was already in a position to spread across borders as worldwide travel generally continued. 

On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. The decision was based on its rapid and widespread transmission, the likes of which the world had not seen for more than a century with the Spanish Flu in 1918. The virus soon spread to other countries, primarily through international travel, and it reached 200 countries in just months – quickly reaching Europe, North America, and around the globe. This outbreak led to widespread health crises, economic disruptions, and societal changes. (WHO, 2024). 

B. Background on the WHO and its Relationship with IHR

Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the WHO is a specialized agency of the United Nations, which was established on April 7, 1948. This date, now celebrated annually as World Health Day, marks the beginning of a global effort to improve health standards and manage health crises on an international scale. (WHO, 2021). WHO’s core mission is to promote health, keep the world safe, and serve the vulnerable, encompassing a broad array of activities aimed at enhancing global health standards and coordinating international health efforts. (WHO, 2024).

The WHO operates through a structured governance system. The World Health Assembly (WHA), its decision-making body, comprises representatives from all member states and convenes annually to set policies, approve budgets, and make critical decisions on health issues. (WHO, 2021). The Executive Board, composed of 34 members elected for two-year terms, implements WHA decisions and provides guidance on health policies and programs. The WHO Secretariat, led by the Director-General, manages the organization’s daily operations.

Among its many functions, the WHO is known for developing international health standards, providing technical assistance to countries, and monitoring global health trends. It also plays a crucial role in disease prevention, strengthening health systems, and helping coordinate emergency response. Notable achievements include the eradication of smallpox and ongoing efforts to control polio, which underscore the WHO’s significant impact on global health. (WHO, 2021).

The IHR is an international legal agreement first adopted in 1969 by all 194 WHO member states with the goal of managing specific diseases such as cholera, plague, yellow fever, smallpox, relapsing fever, and typhus. (WHO, 2021). However, as global health threats evolved, so too did the IHR with several changes adopted over the next 35 years. 

In the early 2000s, the IHR was revised once more to address an even broader spectrum of public health emergencies, reflecting the changing nature of worldwide health risks and the impact of globalization. This latest set of amendments, called IHR 2005, were introduced to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of diseases while minimizing unnecessary interference with international travel and trade. It was the version of the IHR in place when COVID-19 first emerged. 

In more recent years, the IHR was updated once again, covering all public health emergencies – not just those related to specific diseases – and emphasizes a comprehensive approach to health security. This includes requirements for countries to develop and maintain core capacities to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats. (Taylor, 2020).

III. Shortcomings of IHR 2005 Exposed by COVID-19:

Even though the WHO worked hard to prepare for a pandemic, including the approval of IHR 2005, it was not fully prepared for a disease that spread with the speed and ease of COVID-19. In retrospect, there were critical gaps in its regulations – and in how each member state interpreted and executed them – that led to delayed and inconsistent compliance. Ultimately, these problems had national and global repercussions, including the death of millions of people, the investment of trillions of dollars in relief, and a significant impact on people’s mobility, work, and even mental health. These are some of the key shortcomings that were exposed:

A. Slowness of Declaration of a PHEIC

One clear gap in IHR 2005 was how and when a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, or PHEIC, is declared. A PHEIC is defined by the IHR as “an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other states through the international spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated international response.” The purpose of declaring a PHEIC is to prompt global cooperation and mobilize resources for a coordinated response to manage and contain health emergencies. (Stuckleberger, 2020). This designation facilitates the implementation of measures and strategies to prevent the spread of the disease and reduce its impact on global health.

Despite early indications of a novel respiratory illness in China in late 2019, a PHEIC was not declared until January 30, 2020. (History, 2020). This delay was in part caused by China placing considerable effort into suppressing information and attempting to prevent critical test results from leaving China’s borders, but it was also caused by an apparent lack of clarity on the wording of what constitutes an extraordinary event. 

The results of a delayed PHEIC were significant on a global scale, with clear implications to global response timing, coordination, and resource allocation. For instance, WHO noted that a late start dampened efforts to mobilize resources, coordinate surveillance, and deploy critical medical supplies and personnel to affected regions. (WHO, 2024). In order to prevent similar results in the future, new language and alignment on the definition of a PHEIC would be needed, and the WHO would need to provide greater assurances to individual countries that sensitive information would be protected in order to encourage them to willingly share information. 

B. Delayed Reporting and Fragmented Response Mechanisms

Effective pandemic response hinges on the prompt and transparent reporting of outbreaks by member states. As mentioned, the initial reaction to COVID-19 was compromised by local Chinese authorities hiding information and downplaying the severity of the situation. However, other countries around the world also established barriers in reporting cases and sharing crucial information about the virus. This inability, or unwillingness, to comply with reporting obligations specifically called out by IHR 2005 led to critical global delays in assessing the gravity of the problem and the timing of a coordinated counterattack.

A second component of response that broke down during the pandemic was the consistency in which corrective efforts – called the “response mechanism” – were carried out worldwide. Many countries, particularly low and middle-income nations, struggled to allocate adequate funds for surveillance, laboratory capacity, and public health infrastructure. (Jones, 2021). They simply had too many domestic needs competing for limited resources, and thus reacted with varying degrees of effectiveness. Compounding the problem, the WHO’s ability to support these countries of lower socioeconomic status with technical assistance and financial support was hindered by funding shortages and competing global health priorities. This divide highlighted the urgent need for sustainable financing alternatives to bolster global health security and enhance pandemic preparedness, as well as more-effective prioritization amongst states themselves, to deliver a more-complete response mechanism worldwide.

The combination of delayed reporting and a fragmented response mechanism delivered a perfect environment for a pandemic to thrive. Inconsistencies in how countries communicated about the health risk highlighted vulnerabilities in the enforcement of the IHR 2005. (Stuckleberg, 2020). Added to this, a significant variance in the protections put in place by individual member states to control the spread of the disease resulted in cracks that led to a faster spread. Together, these challenges put the WHO in a position where it was not able to effectively execute on its mission. 

C. Inconsistent Compliance with WHO Recommendations on Travel Restrictions and Quarantines Across Member States

A third and critical deficiency of IHR 2005 was also uncovered by the pandemic: containment. The IHR recommends travel restrictions and quarantine to curb the spread of disease, while minimizing disruptions to international travel and trade. These guidelines are based on scientific evidence and aim to protect global health by advising member states on proportionate measures. (UN, 2020). 

 At the onset of the pandemic, countries implemented travel restrictions at different times based on their assessment of the threat and local public health capabilities. Some nations, such as New Zealand and Australia, quickly imposed strict travel bans and border controls. In contrast, other countries were slower to act, or they implemented partial measures at first – allowing the virus to spread more widely before restrictions were enforced. (Illmer, 2021). 

Quarantines were also not consistent in terms of scope. For instance, some states imposed comprehensive bans on non-citizens and non-residents, while others were less stringent, particularly within their region. Some countries also enforced strict protocols for travelers arriving from high-risk areas, including mandatory health screening and isolation in designated facilities for multiple days. Other countries allowed self-isolation at home or imposed less-rigorous monitoring and enforcement, leading to varying levels of effectiveness in preventing virus transmission. (Illmer, 2021). 

Finally, the extent and frequency of testing for travelers varied widely from one member state to another. Some required multiple tests and proof of negative results, which might have included a mix of tests taken before departure, upon arrival, during a stay, and before return. Other countries required less-frequent testing – sometimes just at arrival or departure, if at all. (Illmer, 2021). 

These differences in approach prevented authorities from detecting and isolating cases quickly. Importantly, the inability to contain the virus also led to more, and faster, mutations – making it even more difficult to diagnose and treat the symptoms, as well as to build an effective vaccine for prevention and elimination. To limit the scale of future pandemics and drive more consistency in the implementation of containment techniques, the WHO would need to better manage numerous factors, including clearer rules, consistent health infrastructure, social factors, and even communication barriers. 

IV. Recent Responses to Address Shortcomings: Amendments to IHR 

While IHR 2005 represented a considerable step forward from its predecessors in terms of preparing the world for a global pandemic, COVID-19 exposed a number of inadequacies in it as well – particularly in the areas of declaration, response, and containment. One of the best ways to address these deficiencies on a global scale was to adjust the IHR even further, which was completed by the WHO in 2024 with a new set of amendments. Below are some of the most important changes that were included.

A. PHEIC and Pandemic Emergency Declaration

Article 54 of the 2024 IHR amendments represents a critical element in the revision process aimed at improving the management and response to PHEIC. This article specifically sets out to address the conditions under which a PHEIC is declared and managed, as well as streamline the PHEIC process, enhance the effectiveness of global responses, and ensure that future emergencies are managed more efficiently. (WHO, 2021).

Specifically, the language now includes better guidance on how to assess the severity of the health threat, its potential for international spread, and the impact on public health systems. (WHO, 2024). It also requires the WHO to assess potential emergencies more promptly, with predefined timelines for decision making and communication. And in addition to addressing past delays in emergency identification, these changes also seek to reduce the risk of premature or inappropriate declarations that may distract important resources during an emergency, by ensuring that only events meeting these stringent criteria are classified as PHEICs.

Once a PHEIC has been named, there is also a need for ongoing assessment of them. Article 54 introduces the concept of mandatory periodic reviews. The WHO Emergency Committee is now tasked with evaluating the status of each in-process PHEIC at regular intervals. (WHO, 2024). These reviews assess whether the conditions warrant the continuation of the PHEIC status, or determine if the status should be downgraded or lifted. This action, which includes evaluating ongoing risks and the effectiveness of response measures, ensures that the PHEIC designation remains relevant and appropriate based on the evolving situation. (Farge, 2023).

B. Reporting and Response in the Context of IHR Amendments

IHR 2005 introduced significant enhancements to promote transparency in information sharing among member states and with the WHO. These amendments were integrated into multiple sections of the IHR, notably Article 10 which focuses on the dissemination of information, and Article 11 which addresses confidentiality and publication of information (Searchinger, 2024).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the challenges of transparency under the IHR 2005 were highly visible. Timely and complete sharing of information between Chinese health authorities and the WHO would have been essential in understanding the nature and severity of the emerging threat. These initial delays, and inconsistencies in reporting and information sharing, greatly impacted early international awareness and response efforts. (WHO, 2024).

Under the latest 2024 amendments, there is a clear emphasis on comprehensive information exchange during public health emergencies. Member states are now further obligated to share timely and accurate data related to disease outbreaks, public health risks, and planned response measures with the WHO and other relevant stakeholders. (Farge, 2023). This includes epidemiological data, laboratory findings, surveillance reports, and best practices in outbreak response.

The amendments also clarify the confidentiality provisions outlined in Article 11, ensuring that sensitive information is appropriately protected while facilitating the dissemination of critical health information. (IHR, 2024). The combination is intended to promote openness and collaboration among member states, aiming to foster a unified global approach to managing health crises.

C. Coordinating Financial Mechanism

Another key revision now included in the IHR is the Coordinating Financial Mechanism, which aims to break down financial constraints and improve the allocation of resources during health emergencies. The introduction of this mechanism reflects the lessons learned from past crises, including the 2014 Ebola outbreak and the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted the need for more-robust financial coordination and support. (WHO, 2021).

The primary goal of the Coordinating Financial Mechanism is to ensure that sufficient funds are available for effective response to public health emergencies. This includes covering the costs associated with emergency interventions, such as medical supplies, vaccines, and treatments. By securing a reliable funding source, it intends to eliminate financial barriers that may hinder timely and effective responses to health crises. (Stucklerberger, 2020).

The newly defined mechanism also seeks to improve coordination among various funding sources, including governments, international organizations, and private sector entities. This involves streamlining financial contributions and ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently and transparently. The enhanced coordination helps avoid duplication of efforts and ensures that financial resources are directed to where they are most needed, thereby improving the overall effectiveness of the response. (Stucklerberger, 2020).

Lastly, in order to create and build capacity, this mechanism focuses on expanding resources, particularly in second and third-world countries. This includes funding to strengthen health infrastructures, improve surveillance systems, and train healthcare workers. By addressing capacity gaps, it aims to improve the preparedness and response capabilities of countries with limited resources, ensuring a more equitable and effective global response. (Miller, 2024).

V. Looking Ahead: Geopolitical Challenges to Global Health Cooperation

The 2024 amendments to IHR 2005 represent meaningful progress in the preparation for the world’s next great pandemic. However, there is still work to be done. Additional obstacles, which previously stood in the way of a unified, global response during COVID-19, will likely remain in place even after the latest changes are implemented. Largely geopolitical in nature and driven by individual countries’ own unique political, economic, and social priorities, these ongoing challenges may require additional clarification, diplomatic efforts, or new amendments to ensure consistent execution against the obligations set out in IHR. 

A. Vaccine Nationalism

Vaccine nationalism emerged prominently during the COVID-19 pandemic, where wealthier nations prioritized securing vaccine doses for their populations through bilateral agreements and domestic production. This approach resulted in disparities in global vaccine distribution, with low-income countries facing delays in accessing vaccines through multilateral initiatives like COVAX (Miller, 2024). 

For instance, countries like the United States and numerous European nations signed early procurement deals with vaccine manufacturers, ensuring rapid vaccination of their populations. In contrast, many third-world countries struggled to secure sufficient vaccine supplies, prolonging the pandemic’s impact on their vulnerable populations. Agreements on vaccine equity and balanced distribution will be necessary to prevent a similar situation in the future. 

B. Political Tensions and Information Sharing

Long-standing tensions among certain member states likely contributed to delays in information sharing and cooperation during the initial stages of COVID-19. China is a known political rival of the United States and other Western countries, which gave them an incentive to withhold critical epidemiological data coming out of Wuhan from the rest of the world in the early days of the pandemic. This, of course, disrupted early global awareness and response efforts, allowing the virus to spread beyond China’s borders before global countermeasures were fully in place. 

China was highly criticized about its lack of information transparency and timely notification to international health authorities. (Miller, 2024). However, past criticism largely from existing rivals may not be enough to change this behavior in the future – particularly when officials may see sharing sensitive information as a sign of geopolitical weakness or as a national security threat. The confidentiality provisions outlined in Article 11 are designed to help prevent these practices, but nationalistic tendencies are more likely to win out during a crisis. Additional international relations efforts by individual states to solidify alignment on global health priorities will be necessary, as will unified global pressure to adhere to the amended principles of IHR.

C. Trade and Export Restrictions

One of the most essential worldwide needs during the pandemic was for healthcare items like respirators, which were critical for some of the hardest-hit COVID patients to breathe. Expecting a high demand domestically for these medical supplies and related personal protective equipment (PPE), numerous countries implemented international trade restrictions and export bans on them. Such protectionist measures disrupted global supply chains and exacerbated shortages of essential medical supplies in regions heavily impacted by COVID-19 (Miller, 2024). 

Similar to what led to vaccine nationalism, country leaders will be tempted in future healthcare crisis situations to protect their citizens first. A commitment to preventing these practices – via additional clarifications to the IHR, or even new amendments – will be needed to avoid putting overseas frontline workers and vulnerable populations at greater risk. Additional diplomatic efforts will also be necessary to ensure open, international cooperation in pandemic response.

VI. Conclusion

COVID-19 highlighted a critical need for transparent communication, enforceable mechanisms, and equitable distribution of resources to ensure effective preparedness and response. IHR 2005 provided a solid starting point to accomplish these core objectives, but a number of deficiencies were exposed during the height of the pandemic that led to unnecessary worldwide disruptions, spending, and suffering. 

The latest round of amendments, which were adopted in June 2024, address some of the most important gaps in IHR 2005 including those related to declaration, response, and containment. They represent the coordinated effort of the WHO and its member states, and they are likely to further enhance global resilience against future health threats and foster international solidarity in health crises. 

However, there are still obstacles to be overcome – most notably geopolitical factors such as vaccine nationalism, political tensions affecting information sharing, and trade barriers – which can lead to disparities in vaccine distribution, delayed international cooperation, and strained global health governance processes. As we reflect on the lessons learned from COVID-19, it becomes evident that investing in global health security frameworks is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic necessity that will require ongoing clarifications, amendments, and diplomatic ingenuity.  

VII. Acknowledgments

The author of this paper would like to acknowledge Dr. Allyn Taylor – for her support throughout the writing process.

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About the author

Sydney Garber

Sydney Garber is a senior at Capital High School in Boise Idaho. She is a top ten student in her class and is actively involved in student government and mock trial, as well as an all-state softball pitcher.

Sydney intends to study international relations in college, with a long-term goal of becoming a foreign diplomat or working at the United Nations. To that end, she is the campus captain of a statewide program to drive voter registrations and has interned at the DACOR-Bacon House in Washington DC – an organization dedicated to leaders in international relations and foreign policy.

In addition to pursuing her career aspirations, Sydney is also an active volunteer. She is Founder and President of The Iron Butterfly Initiative – an organization dedicated to advancing mental health in women’s sports – which has been covered by the Associated Press and more than 250 media outlets worldwide. She is also a founding member of the Idaho branch of the National Charity League, where she served as Vice President of Philanthropy and Vice President of Programming.

The post The Short- and Long-Term Shortcomings of the International Health Regulations (IHR) Exposed by COVID-19 appeared first on Exploratio Journal.

Introduction

Trade between the United States (US) and China, the world’s largest economies, has been turbulent over the past decade. China became the US’s largest trading partner in November 2013, and it remained that way for the larger part of the past decade, but due to the ongoing trade war between the two countries, and an increasingly hostile sentiment in both countries due to geopolitical conflicts, Mexico surpassed China as the US’s biggest trading partner in February of 2021 (US Census Bureau Foreign Trade, n.d.). The continued erosion of diplomatic as well as economic relations between the US and China poses implications for the world at large (S&P Global, n.d.). 

In the US, China’s image has continued to sour, reaching an all-time low in 2023 as a result of COVID-19 and amid mounting trade tensions; Pew reported that in 2023, some 83% of US adults held unfavorable views of China (Fagan, 2023). This negative perception is further fueled and reflected by the news media, which has long played a central role in shaping both public opinion and policymakers’ perspectives on international affairs (Chen & Wang, 2022; Cyber-Diplomacy, 2002).

The U.S. stance on trade with China has shifted significantly under the administrations of Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden, with unfavorable views of China rising by 29% during Trump’s presidency, as he treated China as an economic and military “enemy” (Higgins, 2019). Since hard news coverage sets the tone of ongoing policy issues, public perceptions are likely to be reflected in media coverage. Studying that media coverage directly can help us understand the media’s agenda-setting role with respect to US-China trade relations. 

In this study, I investigate firstly how the tone of US media coverage of trade with China has changed over time. Additionally, I ask whether the media increasingly portrayed China in a negative light during the Trump administration and whether the tone of the coverage returned to its pre-Trump baseline during the Biden administration. Additionally, to explore the effect of political alignment on news reporting and determine whether the political skew of news media affects coverage of trade with China, I ask the following question: How does the political alignment of a media source affect its coverage of trade with China? Along with studying the general trends in media coverage over time, I will also study the topics and concerns that influence perception and perception changes the most by asking the following question: what topics influence the tone of media coverage on trade with China the most? 

To investigate these questions, I use newspaper article data from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) across three consecutive time periods (2013-2016, 2017-2020, 2021-2024). A total of 91 relevant articles from the NYT and 129 relevant articles from the WSJ were coded for the general tone and specific mentions of trade with China. I analyzed quotations and general trends in Google Sheets. 

I find that US media portrayals of China worsened over time, and soured particularly during the Trump administration. Additionally, I find that while the left-leaning New York Times was susceptible to administration changes, the Wall Street Journal’s portrayals remained largely consistent over the years. Topics such as tariffs, technology, and trade disputes, were the main focuses of US news media. By studying the changes in US media portrayal of trade with China, this research aims to further understand the role of US media in US-China trade relations. 

Literature Review

1. China-US Trade Relations

To encapsulate the development of the US-China trade relations, researchers point to a few key events. China’s trade relations with the US were defined most notably by China joining the WTO in 2001, the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath (Chen & Wang, 2022). While the relationship was initially positive, the relationship began to deteriorate, starting with smaller and separate disputes that eventually developed into a full-fledged trade war. In recent years, researchers point to events such as the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the official start of the US-China trade war that began with the introduction of new US tariffs on solar panels in 2018, and even events that appear less related to trade, such as the COVID-19 epidemic, or human rights in Tibet (Ramirez & Rong, 2012; Tang & Willnat, 2023). Overall, the US’s grievances against China have centered around a few issues: China’s trade practices, most notably its alleged currency manipulation, forced intellectual property (IP) transfers, as well as the China-US trade deficit (Ramirez & Rong, 2012, p. 1). While previous literature has studied US perceptions of China over generally shorter time frames, such as those following COVID-19, this research will study the US tone of media coverage on trade with China over a longer period of time, thus providing a broader understanding of trends in the tone of media coverage over time. 

2. Political Differences

Both the contemporary political environment as well as the political skew of media outlets have an impact on their general stance on China. Hard news both reflects and informs the general sentiments of the population at any time. Under three different administrations since 2013, the US’s perception of China has become increasingly adversarial. Most notably, the Trump Administration treated China as an economic and military “enemy”; and according to a Pew survey, the share of Americans holding unfavorable views of China grew by 29% during the time Trump was in office (2017-2021) (Fagan, 2023; Higgins, 2019). In general, liberals and conservatives are divided in their views of China, with conservatives likely to be more adversarial (Jin et al., 2022, p. 4). This division is reflective of the general party stance as well as actions and rhetoric employed by respective administrations while in office. While previous literature has mainly focused on influences of political alignment on perceptions of China in general within the general population, this research aims to analyze that influence in news media, both in terms of bias as well as the administration in power. 

3. Role of Media on International Trade

The media represents one of the primary channels through which individuals consume information on international affairs and public opinion, which in turn influence the perception people have of certain countries (Wanta & Golan, 2004). Media portrayals influence policymakers as well, and even with the rise of social media today traditional news media continues to be a source of information for politicians (Cyber-Diplomacy, 2002). As a result, news media often also serves as a mirror, reflecting the nation’s identity and political and trade agenda (Cook, 2005). Therefore, analysis of trends in hard news will examine how media sets the agenda of public debates and shapes public opinion. While most literature confined news analysis to shorter timeframes or neglected to compare separate US outlets with each other, this research aims to study the impact of news media over a more extensive timeframe and seeks to compare key topics’ presence in news to help better understand the issues and topics that drive perceptions on US trade with China.

4. Hypotheses

Republicans have consistently held more negative views on China as opposed to Democrats and previous surveys have revealed the significant souring of China’s perception in the US during the Trump administration (Fagan, 2023; Huang, 2020). Overall, this suggests that under the Trump administration, media perception of China follows the general trend and therefore also becomes more negative. I therefore propose:

Hypothesis 1: media coverage of trade with China will be the most adversarial in the years of Trump’s presidency (2017-2021) and less so in the four years before that and in the time up till now. 

The effect of the trade war as well as COVID-19 on the tone of media coverage of China is also likely to leave lasting impacts. Indeed, the Trump administration introduced various elements of uncertainty to trade relations between the US and China, such as the initiation of the trade war in 2018. Additionally, the Biden administration has continued to place additional tariffs on China, such as the increase in import taxes on Chinese EVs, and has preserved various Trump-era tariffs. I therefore propose:

Hypothesis 2a: the tone of media coverage of trade with China remains relatively negative post-Trump. 

However, since political rhetoric during the Biden administration has also proven to be significantly less preposterous, there is the likelihood that media coverage has toned down during his administration. This leads me to propose:

Hypothesis 2b: the tone of media coverage of trade with China recovers and returns to pre-Trump levels during the Biden administration. 

Since Republicans tend to view China more negatively, I therefore pose:

Hypothesis 3: media coverage of trade with China in right-leaning news media (such as WSJ) will be more adversarial than those in left-leaning news media (such as NYT). 

As the US increasingly views rising China and its growing economic influence in the world as a national security threat, and as tariffs and grievances focus increasingly on a few certain topics, I suggest:

Hypothesis 4: topics such as cybersecurity, technology, trade deficit, and China’s trade tactics and regulations will affect US media coverage the most. 

Data and Methods

1. Data

Data for this study was made up of relevant news reports and op-eds published in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal between 1 January 2013 and 8 February 2024 to cover the three most recent administrations. A total of 220 relevant articles were obtained, of which 91 were from NYT and 129 were from WSJ. 

I divided the larger timeframe into three four-year time frames to cover the three respective administrations of Obama, Trump, and, now, Biden. I made a search in the ProQuest database using the terms “China” and “trade” within a vicinity of five words and in a timeframe of a week. 21 weeks were selected at random within each four-year period in order to craft a purposeful sample due to the large volume of the available data; specifically, 21 weeks represents about 10% of the total time in any four-year time period. All relevant articles were collated and downloaded so that each file represented all relevant articles within a week. To ensure that all articles fell under the category of hard news, opinion and commentary pieces, including editorials, were excluded during coding. Additionally, articles that were irrelevant thematically were also marked as so and discarded during coding. 

The New York Times and Wall Street Journal were chosen as targets for this research because of their respective political leanings. These two publications fulfill the requirement of having broad media coverage as well as being sufficiently different in terms of political alignment. Ad Fontes Media rating of NYT has it at a relatively reliable 41.91 and a -7.94 bias rating (on a scale of 42, where neutral is 0 and extremely left-leaning is -42 while the extreme right is +42). On the other hand, WSJ was rated at 43.34 reliability and +4.24 bias. While the New York Times is slightly more skewed compared to the Wall Street Journal, a better pair of outlets could not be found as the type and accessibility of the publications data was also a limiting factor (Interactive Media Bias Chart, n.d.).

2. Coding

I conducted the coding of news articles to systematically analyze the portrayal of trade relations between the U.S. and China in the media and to answer the four research questions. The goal of coding was to identify the general sentiment on trade with China in each of the three time frames for the two different news outlets, as well as identify the topics that were most relevant to these sentiments. 

To classify the articles, I developed a systematic coding scheme. There were five code categories, some were developed iteratively while others were set from the beginning. These were “General Tone,” “Perception of China,” “Quote/Not Quote,” “Speaker,” and “Substantive Domain.” The former four categories were set from the beginning while the “Substantive Domain” codes developed as coding progressed. “General Tone,” and “Perception of China,” specifically analyze the tone that the speaker employs when describing trade with China. Negative or adversarial portrayals were when China was portrayed as causing great harm, having a trade agenda that was against the interests of the US, or being an adversary in the “trade war.” Positive portrayals were when China was portrayed as being a collaborator with the US on trade, or the relationship being one of mutual benefit. Neutral portrayals were when authors remained relatively neutral. 

Coding was done manually using Atlas. ti. During coding, I first did a search of the article using the words “China” and “U.S.” to determine relevant sections, which I then read; if “China” and “U.S.” were consistently mentioned, the entire article was read. I coded sentences that characterized China in certain ways: whether “adversarial”, “neutral” or as “a partner.” Articles were coded as well for speaker and substantive domain. After reading, I coded the article as a whole on “General Tone,” which ranged from “Adversarial,” to “Neutral,” and “Positive.” Coding for the substantive domain was iterative and when the codebook was revised, I revisited and recoded previous articles; this proved not to be a challenge as topics were added as they appeared and overlapping codes merged at the end of the coding process. Challenges during the coding surrounded the coder bias, as coding became more consistent as the process went on. To address this, earlier articles were revisited and the coding was revised for consistency. 

Codes and quotes were stored in Atlas.ti and exported to Google Sheets for analysis to ensure that the data was easily accessible and to enable more efficient analysis. Individual quotes occupied separate rows in the sheet and had properties discerning its outlet (NYT or WSJ), timeframe, week number, and separate properties for all existing codes (with binary 0s and 1s assigned in cells to indicate the codes assigned to the quote). 

To analyze the change in general tone over time, I sorted quotes first by news outlet and then by timeframe; in this way quotes were separated by outlet and time, for example, all NYT articles from a certain timeframe were put together. For every timeframe, the number of articles having “Adversarial Portrayals” was divided by the number of total articles coded for “General Tone” to give the percentage of adversarial portrayals in the timeframe. I then organized the six percentages (three from NYT and three from WSJ representing the three timeframes) in a table and generated Figure 1 and Figure 2. 

To analyze the trends in the substantive domain, I separated the data by timeframe exclusively, disregarding the specific news outlet. I divided the total appearances of a specific code under “Substantive Domain” in a certain timeframe by the total amount of “Substantive Domain” codes during the timeframe to give the percente of its prevalence during that specific time period. I then organized the resulting percentages into a chart and generated Figure 3. 

Findings

To study how US media coverage of China has changed over the three most recent administrations and gauge Trump’s impact on media discourse, I compared the number of adversarial articles published in a given year to the total number of relevant articles in that same year. As shown in Figure 1, adversarial portrayals of China in the US media increased over the three four-year timeframes, from 63.98% between 2013-2016 to a high of 75.85% in 2017-2020, and finally decreasing to 67.12% in 2021-2024 but not returning to original levels. Overall, these findings indicate that news reporting was consistently more adversarial than not and its negative tone largely increased over the course of the three administrations, only decreasing slightly between the Trump and Biden administrations. Figure 1 also provides evidence for Hypothesis 1 concerning the media perception of China during Trump’s presidency. During the time Trump was in office (2017-2020), adversarial portrayals of China in news media grew by 11.87% from when Obama was in office. The adversarial portrayals of China were also the highest during that time compared to the two other timeframes, thus affirming the hypotheses. 

Trump had a lasting impact on media coverage of trade with China. Figure 1 indicates that while adversarial media portrayals decreased (from 75.86% in 2017-2020 to 67.12% in 2021-2024), negative portrayals during the Biden administration have yet to return to the levels observed during the Obama administration. This suggests that while neither Hypothesis 2a nor 2b is fully right, the answer is somewhere in between the two. While political rhetoric and actions during the Trump administration had a negative lasting impact on coverage of trade with China, the tone did indeed improve between the Trump and Biden administrations. 

To test how the political alignment of media outlets influenced media portrayals of China, the trends of adversarial portrayals were analyzed separately by newspaper over time. As shown in Figure 2, adversarial portrayals of trade with China in the New York Times rose sharply between the Obama and Trump administrations and recovered slightly in the Biden administration (Obama: 57.69%, Trump: 82.05 %, Biden: 66.67%). On the other hand, media portrayals by the Wall Street Journal have remained consistently adversarial (Obama: 70.27%, Trump: 69.64 %, Biden: 67.57%). This indicates that while left-leaning news was originally more optimistic and positive about trade with China, the mood soured drastically during the Trump administration, and in recent years, left and right-leaning media sources share a stance on trade with China. Thus, while hypothesis three was originally true in 2013-2016, the left-leaning NYT had significantly more negative portrayals of China during the Trump administration (NYT: 82.05% WSJ: 69.64%) and leveled out with right-leaning WSJ during the Biden administration.

On the contrary, however, the tone of reporting from the WSJ experienced little change over the course of the three administrations. Adversarial portrayals of trade with China remained largely steady (2013-2016: 70.27%, 2017-2020: 69.64%, 2021-2024: 67.57%). This indicates that while the NYT was more susceptible to changing political rhetoric, the reporting from the WSJ remained consistent. 

To test how different topics or events influenced the tone of US media coverage of China differently over time, the substantive domain of passages in articles regarding trade with China was analyzed. Figure 3 shows the percent prevalence of specific topics and their change over the years. In 2013-2016, the most influential topics were “Trade Disputes”, “Growth in bilateral trade”, “China’s Trade Agenda,” and “US’s Trade Agenda” (15.09%, 11.32%, 11.32%, 10.32% respectively). “China’s Trade Agenda,” and “US’s Trade Agenda” respectively refer to the specific trade strategies or efforts by the two countries, for instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is classified under “US’s Trade Agenda.” During this time, the growth of bilateral trade between the two countries was reported extensively and was instrumental in informing the general media perception of trade with China. For reference, “Growth in Bilateral Trade” was not a significant factor in either 2017-2020 or 2021-2024. This is indicative of the fact that increased US trade with China was a relatively novel topic. Additionally exclusively in 2013-2016, the topics “Currency Manipulation” and “Job Concerns” were prevalent (both 7.55%). This is reflective of the specific concerns of the Obama Administration on increased trade with China during that specific timeframe. Later on, these specific concerns were not a primary focus. 

During 2017-2020, “Trade Disputes” was the most influential topic (25.48%). “Trade Disputes” remained a hot topic throughout the three time frames (15.09% in 2013-2016; 15.00% in 2021-2024) but were about 10% more prevalent during 2013-2016. “Tariffs” also follow a similar trend, being the most prevalent during 2017-2020 at 11.08% (about 9% more prevalent than during either 2013-2016 or 2021-2024).  

A connection can be drawn between these trends and specific policies enacted during the Trump administration, notably, the beginning of the US-China trade war. The increase in the prevalence of the topic of “Technology” during this specific time period is also indicative of the correlation between the political rhetoric of the Trump administration and specific media representations of trade with China. The topic “Technology” shot up in prevalence in 2017-2020 from 0.94% during the previous timeframe to 8.86%. This makes sense as a significant portion of US tariffs enacted on China during that period were on technologies, more specifically solar panels (York, 2024). Interestingly, however, technology remained a focus in 2021-2024, and its prevalence increased to 9.5%. This indicates that the Biden administration continued to focus on important technology industries in the US. This is mirrored, for example, in the Biden administration’s increased semiconductor, battery, EV, and medical product tariffs (The White House, 2024).

The topic “China’s Trade Policy” grew over the three timeframes (2013-2016: 5.66%, 2017-2020: 9.42%, 2021-2024: 11.50%). This indicates that the political rhetoric became increasingly frustrated with China’s trade practices as time went on. 

Conclusion

In this study I set out to examine how US media coverage of trade with China changes based on a variety of factors: time, political environment, as well as political bias. I  used two US-based hard-news outlets, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, two oppositely skewed outlets to collect relevant data. Employing qualitative coding and analysis methods, I gathered data and quantified and measured specific trends in US media perception of trade with China. 

My findings suggest that although a variety of factors have influenced media coverage of trade with China, US media perception follows a general trend and is heavily influenced by the contemporary political environment as well as specific developments in US-China trade. In the past decade, changing political administrations and the corresponding political rhetoric as well as trade policies as played the primary role in driving change in media portrayals. Interestingly, the analysis found that while the right-leaning WSJ was consistently adversarial towards China in trade, the left-leaning NYT, while initially significantly friendlier was heavily influenced by the adversarial political rhetoric of the Trump Administration. 

Media portrayals of trade with China play a huge role in informing the perception of the wider population as well as politicians and policy-makers. Understanding the how and why behind the changes in US media portrayals of trade with China is thus crucial to understanding the larger stance of the US on the issue. As trade disputes between the US and China continue to unravel, implications will be felt worldwide. This analysis of US media portrayals finds out what drives the US and paints a better picture of its stance on trade. 

About the author

Yuan Peng

Y.A. Peng is a student at the Cate School with a strong passion for political science as well as community engagement. Yuan is deeply interested in US and China relations and how they play out, not only in the two countries but also in other regions in the world. Yuan is a leader on campus and is the co-founder of the debate and ethics club, as well as a Student DEI Representative. In his free time, he reads and has a passion for the visual arts.

The post US Media Representations of China: a Study of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal in Reporting on Trade With China appeared first on Exploratio Journal.