Abstract

Over the past 20 years, China could be seen rising steadily to one of the world’s great powers. Politically, China has an active foreign policy, and actively engages in protecting territorial sovereignty and gaining international influence. Economically, by joining the WTO, China has since transformed into a world economy. Externally, these changes also result in a variety of economic and political counterattacks by the US. Internally, the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to consolidate its power has led the nation into increasingly centralized both economically and politically. This paper is going to argue that attempting to reconcile economic liberalization with authorization is not sustainable.

Challenges Faced by China amid Economic Liberalization

China’s economic rise in the past 20 years saw the nation emerge as a world superpower thanks to free-market reforms undertaken in the 1990s. Externally, it has been active in asserting control over a large share of territory in the Pacific and more generally, in exercising international influence; internally, it is focused on solidifying the CCP regime by more tightly controlling the country and its citizens. However, these changes are increasingly at odds with
economic liberalization; the benefits that come with opening the market cannot coexist with tighter control by the party. As a result, because it is not possible to reconcile authoritarianism with free markets and private property, the Chinese government’s current policy is not sustainable.

Literature Review

China’s economic rise to one of the world’s great powers is undeniable. But opinions differ on whether China will compete with the International order created by the US hegemony 3 and whether it has the ability to become the next hegemony. Some findings suggest that there are critical barriers China must cross in order to create a hegemony like the US.

In “China’s rise and US hegemony,” Rosemary Foot argues that despite China’s material resurgence, it is not able to become a true hegemon due to its inability to find a balance between protecting its own interests and reassuring its neighbors that it does not threaten their interests (Foot, 2019). China’s material resurgence in recent years is evidenced by increased exports, investments, and trade, a growing scientific, particularly space ambition, and having the world’s second-largest defense budget. China’s management strategy in East Asia, despite attempts to reassure its neighbors through creating international organizations, is characterized by its determination to protect its sovereign claims and engage in bilateral relationships such as in the BRI. As Foot argues, China would be at most a restricted constituency due to the leveraging of its economic and military power against seeking bilateral relationships which create normative order and stabilize the region.

Some findings suggest that China is beginning to compete with the US, and possibly create a new international order.

Mearsheimer uses the concept of offensive realism to argue US engagement policy with China is doomed to fail, and this paper takes this as the point of departure to argue that China’s expanding power to protect its interest is inevitable (Mearsheimer, 2001). In international anarchy, a world absent of a central and dominant authority, since states can never be sure of others’ intention, in order to maximize security, a state would always compete with each other. Mearsheimer uses this to predict that in order to achieve maximum security, China would want to create a regional hegemon, hence it would not settle with US possible containment policies.

Findings from Cooley and Nexon further discuss China’s threat to US hegemony and suggest that China is beginning to compete with US hegemony and possibly create a new international order (). According to their paper, since 1997, China and Russia made it clear their goal was to promote a multi-polar world; they allied in the UN, tolerated each others’ international projects, and both created international institutions to gather more allies. China also routinely provides economic aid to other countries, with the goal of gaining allies in these international institutions. These countries, which before were either directly or indirectly a part of the US hegemonic project, now have a choice to join China. The post-Cold War liberal international order was also challenged by illiberal competitors in many areas. Far-right organizations in traditional western liberal countries have gained increasing international recognition and support from Beijing and Moscow; many countries such as China began to sponsor their own NGOs to compete with western ones; authoritarian countries began to believe liberal ideals are a threat to their security. These movements can be understood as evidence of China’s increasing power in the world.

Malkin takes on a different approach and argues that China has the potential to challenge the US structural power from the aspect of productive power (Malkin 2020). He argues that the recent Chinese policy MIC 2025 had allowed it to ascend in the global value chain. China is able to increase its influence by capturing more global intangible assets and raising its market share using favorable IP commercialization, standardization, and competition policies. This paper is going to evaluate China’s aggressive economic approaches like this.

China’s foreign strategy

Over the past 20 years, China’s foreign policy can be described as highly active. This paper will categorize its policy as both protection of territorial sovereignty and attempting to gain international influence.

Protecting territorial sovereignty has long been one of China’s biggest foreign policy goals. One of the most important strategic competitions China is involved in is over the South China Sea (SCS). With an estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, SCS, countries around the region such as China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have been vying for control over the region (Territorial disputes in the South China Sea). Recently, China has been seen through satellite images working to increase the size or even build new islands in an attempt to gain more control. China’s strategy in SCS can be seen as an attempt to gradually shift the status quo in its favor without engaging in actual military conflicts. Some refer to this as a salami-slicing strategy where China slowly captures and sets up defenses around new territories to gradually wear its opponents down.

Another strategy China uses to create influence is by engaging with international alliances and organizations while also building regional institutions. For example, China’s power and influence in the UN are increasing significantly as it provides economic support to other countries. In a United Nations Human Rights Council in 2020, a total of 53 countries supported China’s new national security law, overwhelming the 27 members that were against it (Landslide support for Hk law at UNHRC). China has also been actively creating and joining regional economic institutions and signing trade agreements as a means to better connect with other countries in the regions such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Alongside this is the promotion of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). BRI manifests China’s attempt to use its economic leverage to gain allies and influence their policies to oppose the US existing order. However, there are a few problems with this kind of foreign policy. First, using economic leverage to build relationships is not secure. It is likely that once China becomes unable to provide economic support, its allies will quickly turn away. Second, China’s showing off its military power, as in the case of SCS, undermines its credibility that it would be able to maintain safety and order in the region. Third, China’s activity is predatory: many countries China works with have low credit rankings. This slows BRI investment deals and raises concerns inside China regarding the implementation of BRI

US policy on China

American activity has largely been to engage with China economically, believing this would push China towards free-market principles. In 2001, the House of Representatives approved the US-China Relations Act of 2000, which essentially showed their support for China to join the WTO. Consisting of 164 members as of 2021, WTO encourages freer trade, fewer economic barriers, and better trade deals among its members. Then-president Bill Clinton hoped that by joining the WTO, China could accelerate the progress of opening up its economy to the rest of the world, and naturally move away from the communist political model and join the US-led liberal democratic order. Specifically, China would have to reduce tariffs, guarantee intellectual property rights. Politically, WTO and its members can serve as a check for the Chinese communist government. In reality, while China’s economy grew remarkably, its political transformation did not go as the US hoped it would. From 1990 to 2012, the number of people in China living in extreme poverty had fallen two-thirds of the population to under 0.5% ); China’s economy now is 11 times larger than it was in 2001 (China Poverty and Equity Brief). However, the CCP was able to use economic growth to legitimize its rule in China. During the past 20 years, it maintained tight control in Chinese private and public businesses, with an estimated 70% of about 1.86 million private companies having internal CCP-ties.

Clinton also hoped Americans would profit economically from China joining the WTO. In reality, while American consumers benefited from cheaper Chinese products and corporations took advantage of China’s large market, much American labor in the manufacturing industries lost jobs due to China’s competition. President Trump, during his 2016 presidential campaign, used this as rhetoric, saying “They’re using our country as a piggy bank to rebuild China,” Trump said. “We have to stop our jobs from being stolen from us.” A report by the Economic Policy Institute estimates the growing trade deficit with China has cost 3.7 million American jobs since China joined WTO in 2001. It is notable the report also found job losses from the trade deficit in the electronic and computer parts industry accounted for 36.2% of all job losses (Scott & Mokhiber, 2020). The US used to have a comparative advantage in advanced technology, but the fact that China now dominates manufacturing in this industry shows that the former took full advantage in using the opportunity to join the WTO to transform its industrial focus.

While the US economic policy on China at the start of the century was mainly concerned with helping it open up its market to the world, its policy has since changed rapidly in the last 5 years. The US began to pass tariffs and impose sanctions aimed to discourage China’s acquisition of America’s technological expertise. To the US, China’s use of industrial policies, subsidies, and regulatory authorities to acquire technological skills is aggressive. The Made in China 2025 policy, for example, was aimed to improve China’s competitiveness in technological industries by gaining expertise from the US firms. The US suspects IP theft and cyber espionage may be ways that China uses to achieve its goals.

In a 2018 report, the US trade representative found China engaged in (1) forced technology transfer, (2) cyber-enabled theft of U.S. IP and trade secrets, (3) discriminatory and non-market licensing practices, and (4) state-funded strategic acquisition of U.S. assets. Subsequently, the US Congress passed a tariff on Chinese imports worth approximately 250 billion dollars, while China countered with a tariff of about 110 billion. The US imports from China had fallen from 538 billion to 434 billion dollars from 2018 to 2020, just under 100 billion dollars in 2 years (United States Census Bureau).

Imposing tariffs, though significant, was not the only action taken by the US on China, however. The Trump Administration tightened technology exports to China’s Huawei and restricted the use of universal funds to buy the company’s equipment. The Administration also posed sanctions on certain entities and officials in Xinjiang due to the findings on crime against humanity and genocides. Reacting to the National Security Law in Hong Kong, the US passed a series of sanctions and began to eliminate Hong Kong’s special economic status in American trade law. Although the two countries signed a phase one agreement in January of 2020, easing the tensions from the trade war, the economic competition between the two countries is very much alive and has not de-escalated.

Cybersecurity is one of the aspects that intensified China-US relations. The US accused China of endorsing or supporting espionage attacks about a decade ago. On May 19, 2014, for example, the US indicted 5 Chinese military hackers suspected of cyber espionage against 6 US nationals in nuclear power, metals, and solar products industries (The US Department of Justice).

Since this was a hack carried out by members of the Chinese military, it represents the first charge by the US against a state actor in hacking. In July of 2021, the Biden administration accused China of cyberattacks, and according to their findings, China’s hacking has transformed into a far more sophisticated satellite network that perpetuates American companies and interests. The US position on Taiwan (ROC) also causes issues with China. Taiwan’s strait issue has long been the main focus of China’s foreign relations, and China strongly asserts sovereignty over Taiwan.

The US position on Taiwan can be seen as a strong indicator of the relationship between the two countries. While the US had ceased recognizing ROC since 1979, due to the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the US continues to provide military support to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability. The US policy on Taiwan had been purposely kept ambiguous, in order to stabilize cross-strait relations. However, during President Trump’s administration, US-Taiwan ties became significantly stronger following a series of new laws passed by the US. Following the Taiwan Travel Act in March of 2018, high-level diplomatic officials from two countries were encouraged to visit each other. In March of 2020, Trump passed the TAIPEI Act, which further increased the scope of their relationship. Additionally, the Trump Administration escalated arms sales, totaling 18,277.8 million dollars worth of arms to Taiwan in 4 years. In comparison, in 8 years as president, Obama sold only 14,070 million dollars worth of arms.

China has increasingly pressed the Taiwan issue. It has not held back from taking action. In fact, in 2020, a year where most countries were affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, China made a record 380 incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (China’s record entry of Taiwan Airspace, 2021). This may be in part because Taiwan’s ADIZ actually stretches into China’s mainland border as shown in Figure 1, so the incursions may not necessarily threaten Taiwan. However, these actions could be seen merely as a political choice by China directed at the US and its allies for their continuous support for Taiwan; most countries believe that a settlement should be reached on this issue.

Internal Issues

Doing business in China is not necessarily straightforward. It ranks well in the World Bank’s ease of doing business index. But there are some areas of weakness. For example, China is ranked 105 in the world for tax collection. Transactions were not adequately protected by laws and that the government reserves the right to make changes in favor of domestic firms. The ranking is measured by the number of payments, time, and the total tax rate of a case study firm, usually a foreign one. This shows that China imposes a lot of restrictions on foreign firms in order to protect the domestic ones, showing that China is very internally centralized, with a top-to-bottom system. China is ranked 80 in ease of getting credit, which, according to the World Bank “measures the legal rights of borrowers and lenders in secured transactions (or collateral) laws and bankruptcy laws to assess how well these laws facilitate lending.”

This spills over into other areas of business.

Most recently, through passing a series of laws aimed at limiting the expansion of big tech companies, the Chinese government shows its determination to prevent the tech titans from gaining too much political power and limit external, western influence. In April 2021, China imposed a series of restructuring on Jack Ma’s Ant Group, which not only undermined its values but also split the powerful tech firm into several independent businesses. With over 730 million monthly users per month, Ant’s Alipay has a huge amount of consumer data that not only gives it a big advantage in competition but also prompted the government to take action. Other major tech companies such as Tencent and Didi, also faced a crackdown. Since being fined for monopolistic behavior, their stock values had fallen 7% and 27% respectively (Grothau, 2021).

In 2018, the National People’s Congress passed a constitutional change that removes the presidential term limit and allows President Xi Jinping to serve as president for life. This change effectively centralized political power in China into the hands of a single man. Just 10 years ago, within the CCP, there were various factions and then-president Hu had to listen to different opinions. Now, Xi was able to elevate his status and ideology, which possibly meant a more centralized and authoritarian communist government that reduces market power.

According to the analysis by the World Bank, China’s rising inequality from 1990 to 2010 can be attributed to the rapid growth of income from the richer group, growing rural-urban difference, and income from private property, which in turn was a result of China’s opening up its market during the 1990s (Sicular, 2013). Xi’s policy of focusing on internal centralization of power over market growth had led to an improvement in China’s income inequality. According to the World Bank, China’s Gini coefficient data rose steadily from 1990 and peaked at 43.7 in 2010, as shown in Figure 2. Then declined sharply until 2016, the last year for which the World Bank has data.

The fact that the income of the richer group is growing faster than the poorer group is a reflection of a capitalistic market that China was gradually transforming into. While people who live in cities have access to a more modern and capitalistic market and experience rapid income growth, the income of rural households, though growing, is not increasing nearly as fast (China Poverty and Equity Brief from World Bank).

The trend changed in the 2010s. Besides the increasing number of SOEs and tech companies crackdown by the Chinese government, it also implemented a series of pro-farmer policies, personal income tax reform, and financial inclusions, which were aimed to reduce the rural-urban gap. With the “Grain for Green” program aimed to mitigate flooding and soil erosion, the Chinese government sent 124 million people from rural areas, mostly farmers, to transform farmland susceptible to soil erosion into forests. The program not only successfully grew its forest area from 16.74% to 22.5%, an amazing achievement, but it also helped improve the economic situation for millions of rural Chinese people, showing the government’s determination and ability to greatly influence the nation’s economy (How China brought its forests back to life in a decade).

The growth of SOE involvement in Chinese Economic life, instead of reform and reduction of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China, is also an indicator of Xi’s relentless effort to increase the state’s involvement in the economy. In the 1990s, China went through a series of market reforms under Deng Xiaoping. As a result, state-owned enterprises began to adopt western governance structures and aimed to improve efficiency and productivity. In the 2000s, with the creation of new government bodies such as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), the central government began to exert more control over the SOEs.

The Xi Jinping era saw an even larger role played by the SOEs. Since 2003, central SOEs in China have grown from 96 to 189, according to the SASAC website. And, according to the World Bank, although it only accounted for around 25% of the economy, these SOEs were involved in key industries such as energy, aviation, finance, telecoms, and transportation (Zhang). CCP also uses these SOEs to implement its policies, such as the development of semiconductor industries and participation in projects related to the Belt Road Initiative. These actions undermine free-market principles.

Megamerger and global implication

The monopolistic position of these SOEs also gives them an advantage in competition against foreign firms. The government will bail out the troubling SOEs by either giving them lower interest rates or helping merge the companies in megamerger deals. Through these megamergers, China would be able to create large competitive firms that can compete on the global stage. This would undermine global competitiveness in certain sectors as these Chinese firms can offer products at much lower prices with support from the Chinese government.

Media Control

Another way that the CCP uses to gain internal control is through repression of ideas that threaten the legitimacy of the party. There are two forms of repression: media censorship and suppression of minority groups. The Chinese government had long kept control over traditional and new media by using firewalls, jailing up journalists, or targeting publications or websites. Chinese internet censorship is especially notorious for its strict censoring system, known as the Great Firewall. Western websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and some Google services are banned. For two consecutive years, Freedom House ranked China last out of 65 countries in media freedom.

This kind of repression by the Chinese government was not done without a reaction from the public. In more subtle ways, bloggers in sites like Weibo develop an extensive series of pubs, slangs, and memes to avoid censors and voice their own opinions. Some Chinese Internet users also use software programs such as Ultrasurf, Psiphon, and Freegate to get around the firewall. In fact, according to the US Congress, around 1 to 8 percent of Chinese Internet users use proxy servers or VPNs to get around the government’s censor (China, Internet Freedom, and U.S. Policy). Public dissent of government restrictions is rare, but not completely unseen in China. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo was a prominent activist who opposed the CCP’s oppressive regime and censorship in China. In short, despite CCP’s wide-reaching measures to impose restrictions on Chinese people, their actions are not completely accepted and there are voices of dissent in China.

China also suppresses minority groups that are culturally different from the Han ethnic group. A prominent example is the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They are a mostly-Muslim ethnic group in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, and China has been accused of committing a crime against humanity and genocides. The Chinese build re-education camps that use Uyghurs as forced labor. They also create an extensive network of surveillance, including police, cameras, and checkpoints that scan and record individual faces. They actively target religious figures in the regions, in an attempt to eradicate Uyghurs culture.

Conclusion

On weighing up the evidence, we find that CCP is trying to walk a very tight line between authoritarianism and free-market principles, a difficult policy to achieve. Centering around territorial sovereignty protection and gaining international influences, China’s foreign policies are very active. Its activities in the SCS, involvement in international institutions such as the UN, and promotion of the BRI show its commitment to become a global power.

The USA’s relationship with China has intensified in the past 30 years as China swiftly grew to great power. Economically, China’s joining of the WTO has benefitted China significantly, as the former was able to maintain its authoritarian political structure while reaping the benefits from opening its international market. Therefore, the US has taken a variety of economic counterattacks, ranging from tariffs to sanctions on Chinese officials. The two countries also engaged heavily on other issues such as cybersecurity and cross-strait relations. Although a direct conflict is unlikely to happen between the two nations, they were actively opposing each other in a variety of ways.

Internally, under President Xi’s leadership, China is gradually heading towards a more authoritarian government, which will very likely be at the expense of its economic growth. China’s crackdown on tech companies, removal of Xi’s term limit, and policy addressing income inequality, and the number of SOEs can all be seen as evidence of Xi’s relentless effort to centralize the government’s control. As China’s internal repression begins to extend, the legitimacy of the ruling party will very likely be called into question.

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About the author

Cheng-Chieh Chiang

Cheng-Chieh is interested in political science, economics, and sociology and loves golfing

The post Challenges Faced by China amid Economic Liberalization appeared first on Exploratio Journal.

Abstract

This paper investigates why the mask compliance rates were significantly higher in Taiwan than in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic. This distinction can primarily be represented by an individualist vs. collectivist mindset, associated with Western and Eastern countries, respectively. Mask wearing was influenced by collectivism; Taiwan’s proximity to the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the subsequent policies implemented; cultural norms; psychological factors including higher risk attitude, sensitivity to social norms, and compliance with personal surveillance; and demographics including race, political ideology, and social class. Mask wearing is negatively associated with infection rates but is not fact based or logical: multiple psychological and cultural factors contribute to this compliance variability. Therefore, those that don’t comply are not purely defiant; individualists and collectivists just have a different belief system in what they value and how they behave. As a paper that explores reasons for noncompliance, from a public policy perspective, the message in compliance requests must be tailored to a specific belief system that serves an individual and group’s best interest while respecting personal values.

Keywords: COVID-19, mask-wearing, culture, individualist vs. collectivist, psychological factors

Why Mask Compliance Differed in the United States and Taiwan During the COVID-19 Pandemic: How Individualist vs. Collectivist Cultures Respond in Uncertain Times

COVID-19, a disease caused from SARS-CoV-2 virus, first detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, has been a test of responding to health regulations. Common symptoms include cough, fever, chills, loss of taste and smell, just to name a few. Most cases are mild, with symptoms persisting a few days, but some cases are very severe, requiring hospitalization. The virus has ravaged through borders and taken the lives of millions worldwide. Even though the severity of the pandemic varied by country and demographics, the COVID-19 pandemic was an experience that everyone dealt with. However, the responses, attitudes, and behaviors of the citizens of different countries shed light on how people deal during times of uncertainty. Two contrasting examples include the United States and Taiwan. These two countries have significant differences in mask wearing compliance, defined as wearing a mask when in close contact (within 6 feet) of non household members (Key, 2021).

In a literature search of studies on the mask compliance rates between Eastern and Western cultures, there were multiple studies on the compliance rates and reasoning behind this behavior in Western countries, but limited studies in Eastern countries. This would suggest that because the compliance rates are so high in Eastern countries, researchers aren’t conducting studies on why people complied or how to get people to comply, instead they’re more interested in why people DON’T comply.

According to a study conducted by the University of Southern California’s Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research, approximately 83% of Americans agree that masks are an effective way to protect themselves from contracting Americans report actually wearing masks when in public places or in close contact with members not of the same household (Key, 2021). Another study found that 64% of Americans that report not wearing a mask responded, “It is my right as an American to not wear a mask” or “It is uncomfortable.” (Vargas & Sanchez, 2020).

The Taiwanese government, on the other hand, instituted a mask mandate with a fine between $100-500 USD for noncompliance (Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.; Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.). However, there were some reports of non-compliance in some cities in Taiwan. For instance, 604 fines were given in Kaohsiung within 1.5 days (Zheng, 2021) and 848 fines given in Taichung within 2 months (Hong, T. & Lǚ, Z., 2021). Both cities have a population of around 2.7 million, so based on this statistic it can be speculated that the non-compliance rate in Kaohsiung and Taichung is about 0.02% which is still significantly lower than the approximately 50% noncompliance rate in the United States. This finding raises questions on why there is such a big disparity.

The United States has over 330 million people with diverse backgrounds, socioeconomic levels, and beliefs. When the pandemic hit, those outside of the United States saw how a high-income country like the United States dealt with unprecedented circumstances. As of October 2021, the US has over 43 million confirmed cases and 688,000 deaths (World Health Organization, 2021).

Conversely, Taiwan is a densely populated island off the coast of Mainland China with over 23 million people. Due to its proximity to China, where the virus originated, and constant air travel to and from, Taiwan was expected to have the 2nd highest number of cases. However, this was proved to be incorrect. Taiwan along with other countries like Singapore and New Zealand were able to implement policies and community-based preventative measures to slow the rate of transmission and infection rates. By April 2020, the local transmission was at zero (The Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University, 2021).It stayed that way for about a year. When comparing infection and mortality rates, as of October 2, 2021, the confirmed cases per million people in Taiwan and the United States is 680 and 131,020, respectively. The confirmed number of deaths per million people in Taiwan and the United States in 35 and 2,103, respectively (Ritchie et al., 2020). These statistics illustrate the significant contrast in the severity of the pandemic in these two countries with the US infection rate about 200 times that of Taiwan and the US mortality rate about 60 times that of Taiwan. Why is there such a major difference? How did this happen? What lessons can other countries learn and what do the actions by Taiwan tell us about their attitudes and cultural norms?

Specific factors that can explain why the Taiwanese and Americans responded differently to the pandemic lie mainly in cultural differences. These distinctions include Taiwan’s past experience with SARS, established social norms, different healthcare systems and access to resources, an individualist vs. collectivist mindset that serves as the foundation for psychological factors, and diversity in the population.

Past Experience with SARS: Proximal vs. Distal Threat

Taiwan had a greater proximal distance than the United States did to the SARS epidemic in 2003. General psychological principles suggest that first-hand experience has a greater impact on someone than watching from far away. From Taiwan’s experience with SARS, the government put policies in place for controlling another global health crisis, such as universal mask-wearing, quarantine requirements instituted in February 2020, closing down borders to foreigners in March 2020, and contact tracing systems after the first identified case in China (Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 2020). However, Americans had no prior experience with a pandemic to this level. Given Taiwan’s past experience in dealing with a health care crisis, the Taiwanese were more familiar than Americans were with healthcare recommendations when these preventative measures were put in place to curb the spread of COVID-19. Additionally, in the beginning of the pandemic, Americans were not directly involved or affected by the pandemic because of its origin in China. This feeling was bolstered by Trump’s rhetoric calling COVID-19 the China virus, resulting in some Americans believing that they could not get the virus because they had limited a relationship with China. For instance, they weren’t Chinese or planning on visiting China soon.

Differences in the Governmental Leadership

Health Care Services

Another reason is the difference in access to health care services. In the United States, there is no universal health care. Universal health care ensures that all citizens have access to health care services when they need it without financial burden. About 8% of the US population is uninsured (Keisler-Starkey & Bunch, 2020). Given the dozens of insurance companies, including in the public and private sectors, Americans pay different fees, resulting in the fragmented health care system that provides them varying degrees of access to certain medical services. The average annual health insurance in the United States is $5,940. This number fluctuates given location and different insurance tiers. Some plans can reach an upward annual cost of $8000 (Price, 2021).

Taiwan, on the other hand, has the National Health Insurance (NHI) System which provides universal health care to 99% of the population. The NHI provides citizens with “SMART” cards, which store a patient’s medical history and records.

After the first confirmed COVID case was identified in China, Taiwan took strict actions to prevent the transmission to its island, given the frequent flights between Mainland China and Taiwan. Taiwan already had a public health agency, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC), instituted after Taiwan’s experience with SARS in 2003. The CECC responded to the COVID-19 outbreak and followed pre-established protocols to control a pandemic and had access to other data from various government agencies.

On January 20, 2020, when the CECC was activated, patients’ medical history from the “SMART” cards was integrated with their travel history and data. From there, a system categorized each citizen into high risk or low risk for contracting the virus. High-risk individuals were those who had traveled to high-risk areas, such as Wuhan, and low-risk individuals included those who had not traveled abroad and had no preexisting health condition. After this integrated information was stored on a citizen’s “SMART” card, low-risk individuals were ordered to buy a week’s worth of masks and could live normal lives. High-risk individuals, on the other hand, were sent into a two-week quarantine after which they could join everyone else (Wang et al., 2020; Vox, 2021). Quarantines as such were effective because it controlled the spread and didn’t rely on quarantining only symptomatic individuals, as asymptomatic individuals have a high chance of transmitting the virus before developing symptoms, if they develop symptoms (Summers et al, 2020).

Taiwan also banned foreigners from entering and in March 2020, the CECC categorized everyone flying into Taiwan to be considered high risk so they all had to undergo isolation quarantine. To make sure no citizens left their quarantine facility, the CECC tracked people’s location using cell phone data. There were also daily phone call check-ins to monitor any possible symptoms as well as occasional in-person check-ins (Vox, 2021).Taiwan also instituted a fine between NT $200,000 and NT $1,000,000 (approximately $7000 USD and $36,0000 USD) for breaking quarantine rules (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2020).

However, studies have shown that only relying on case-based preventative measures such as quarantine and contact tracing wouldn’t have been sufficient for controlling the pandemic. Instead, population-based measures, such as wearing masks and social distancing, were useful in the initial containment of the virus (Ng et al., 2020). Taiwanese attitudes towards wearing masks and having a collectivist mindset, discussed later in the paper, also helped enforce these measures. Additionally, the then Vice President of Taiwan, epidemiologist Chen Chein-Jen, had broadcast announcements to assist citizens in population based measures such as mask wearing, frequent hand washing, and preventing mask hoarding. Similarly, the CECC set a fixed price for masks and used funds and the military to increase mask production. By January 20, 2020, when the CECC was activated, the government had 44 million surgical masks and 1.9 million N95 masks (Wang et al., 2020).With an integrated health insurance system, quarantine requirements, and resource allocation for mask production, Taiwan was organized and prepared to contain the virus.

U.S. Response to COVID-19

Compared to Taiwan’s approach, the United States’ response to the pandemic was completely different. To start off, the federal government put the responsibility of controlling the pandemic onto the state and local governments. This led to a divided nation, with different states instituting different policies, resulting largely from political ideology (Lewis, 2021).

Additionally, during the beginning of the pandemic, there was limited testing and even so, testing criteria was too high, mainly for symptomatic individuals admitted to hospitals, likely to have COVID-19 (Lewis, 2021). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also released a flawed test, reporting that it could fail 33% of the time (Temple-Raston, 2020). Furthermore, the CDC reported that the spread of COVID-19 likely started in January/February 2020. However, the surveillance systems for detecting the virus and reports of flu-like symptoms were insufficient allowing the virus to spread undetected for more than a month (Jorden et al., 2020).

There was also mixed information from then-President Trump, government agencies including the CDC and the World Health Organization (WHO), and the behaviors from local officials. Examples include Trump’s denial of the seriousness of the virus as well as government agencies changing their message for mask guidance in part due to medical supply shortages for hospitals and health care workers (Molteni & Rogers, 2020; World Health Organization, 2020). The mask guidance during the beginning of the pandemic sent confusing messages for further encouragement of mask-wearing. Until April 2020 for the CDC and June 2020 for the WHO, these agencies only recommended masks for those experiencing symptoms, but it has now been established that the virus can also spread from asymptomatic individuals. Consequently, it creates confusing mask guidance as well as making it hard to know who and which government agency to trust.

Lastly, the US had insufficient contact tracing and quarantine policies put in place, which seen from other countries, such as Taiwan and New Zealand, had a role in attenuating the transmission (Lewis, 2021).

Individualist vs. Collectivist

One way to further understand the striking difference between these two countries is by looking at contrasting social and cultural norms. These perspectives can differ broadly and are learned distinctions in behavior imposed by cultures, through family, friends, classmates, and more. Psychologists that study cultural differences have found a distinction between Eastern and Western culture which provides insight into the difference in pandemic responses. This distinction can be represented by an individualist vs. collectivist mindset, ideas put forth by Markus and Kitayama. An individualist mindset, associated with many Western countries, puts the individual or self above the group. These individuals value and have personal independence. Collectivists, on the other hand, associated with many Eastern countries, have strong social ties and a sense of belonging to their group. Collectivists are more likely to agree that they are willing to sacrifice their own self-interests for the well-being of the group and that their happiness depends largely on the happiness of those around them. Individualists are more likely to agree that they often do their own thing and that whatever happens to them is their own doing, emphasizing the responsibility for personal well-being (Lu et al., 2021).

To illustrate the prevalence of individualist vs. collectivist cultures, in collectivist cultures, it’s more normal to see families of multiple generations living together. In the United States, a record-breaking 64 million Americans live in multi-generational households, including sizable immigrant collectivist populations. Asian and Hispanic populations, many of which are considered collectivist countries, are rapidly increasing in the US. Asians and Hispanics are more likely than whites to live in a multi-generational household, with approximately 29% of Asians and 27% of Hispanics doing so (Cohn & Passel, 2018). This sense of belonging and community from collectivist beliefs, carried over into the United States, include taking care of elderly and 1 putting others’ interests before theirs, such as potentially sacrificing personal health, commitments, or time to help out. Research suggests that collectivists are more likely to care for elderly family members as a means to strengthen family ties whereas individualists are more likely to limit caregiving and use formal social services as a means of support (Pyke & Bengtson, 1996).

This individualist and collectivist mindset can be used to understand how individual and group rights and responsibilities influenced behavior during the pandemic. For example, individual rights include the personal freedom of choosing whether or not to wear a mask and take the vaccine. To further illustrate, an individualist is more likely to say that they don’t want to wear a mask because it’s uncomfortable whereas a collectivist is more likely to agree that discomfort is not a valid excuse for going against group norms. Individual responsibility entails taking care of one’s health, through social distancing and wearing a mask. For instance, an individual wearing a mask for their personal health and not contracting COVID.

Group rights mean that being part of a collective gives access to specific privileges: a right to health care and access to masks and vaccines. Being a member of a group also implies specific behavior expectations. This can include taking the vaccine and following policies such as travel restrictions, quarantine, social distancing, mask mandates, to prevent others from possibly contracting the virus. These important distinctions highlight the different reasons individuals give in mask behavior, with individualists more likely to put themselves before the group and collectivists prioritizing group needs.

Cultural Norms

Even before policies for stopping the spread of the virus were implemented, Taiwan and many other Eastern countries had a norm for wearing surgical masks when experiencing the common cold or similar viruses to protect others and for taking care of the elderly or groups that were at higher risk (Jennings, 2021). So during a pandemic, it seemed normal if not obvious to be wearing masks in public places, on public transportation, and walking around. This mindset and behavior echoes a collectivist mindset present in many Eastern cultures.

For Americans, on the other hand, the preventative measures seemed unusual and unprecedented, since they’ve never experienced a global health crisis to this scale before. Consequently, the pandemic was an anxiety-provoking experience with changes in daily routine, with economic, financial, and health threats, as well as immense uncertainty: lots of unknowns from long-term COVID-19 effects, how to deal with variants, and confusing guidance on preventative measures from government officials and agencies. As a result, the link between behavior and curbing COVID-19 transmission might not have been as straightforward for Americans as it was for the Taiwanese based on different experiences and how the pandemic was handled. Along with the diverse backgrounds of its citizens, the United States found itself divided. As policies such as mask mandates and isolation requirements slowly rolled in, some Americans refused to follow these rules.

Collectivism Predicts Mask-Wearing

It has been well established that masks are an effective way to slow the transmission of COVID-19. Studies have also shown that there is a negative correlation between mask wearing and infection rates. As stated earlier, a USC study reported an approximate 50% mask noncompliance rate in the United States and reports of noncompliance in Taiwan predict an approximate 0.02% noncompliance rate (Key, 2021; Zheng, 2021; Hong, T. & Lǚ, Z., 2021).

Furthermore, studies have also shown that collectivism is positively correlated with mask-wearing. This holds true not only to illustrate the Taiwan vs. United States distinction, but also amongst many individualist and collectivist countries. Countries that scored higher on a reserve-coded scale of Hofstede’s individualism index (represented as a collectivism scale) such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, had higher mask compliance rates than individualist countries that scored lower on the scale such as Sweden, The Netherlands, and Finland. These results are after controlling for other factors (e.g., political affiliation and government stringency) (Lu et al., 2021).

This is true not only when comparing the United States to other countries but stays consistent in the United States, with people in more collectivist regions (states and counties) more likely to wear a mask. For instance, states such as New Jersey, California, and Maryland scored higher on the state-level collectivism scale sourced from Vandello and Cohen (1999) and in mask compliance compared to states such as Arizona, Ohio, and Wisconsin, which scored lower on both the state-level collectivism scale and in mask compliance (Lu et al., 2021).

Masks can create physical inconvenience and be uncomfortable. As said earlier, one study found that 64% of Americans that report not wearing a mask responded, “It is my right as an American to not wear a mask” or “It is uncomfortable.” (Vargas & Sanchez, 2020). These actions follow an individualist mindset of protecting personal choice and freedom, but disregard that their actions can affect others (Stewart, 2020). Conversely, collectivists are more willing to put aside their personal inconvenience for the collective welfare and well-being (Biddlestone et al., 2020).

As mentioned previously, there is a $100-500 USD fine for not complying with mask mandates in Taiwan, along with limited reports of noncompliance (Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.; Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.). In collectivist cultures, the rules are more strict, with hefty consequences for non compliance, because the norm is an expectation to follow the policies implemented. In individualist cultures, on the other hand, the mandates are less strict and more complex and ambiguous because individualists are less likely to comply with rules that sacrifice personal freedom for the well-being and welfare of others. Cultural and personal beliefs can influence how rules are put into place and how people respond.

Additionally, in the US, there is a large divide between democrats and republicans based on their political ideology. Republicans can be seen as more individualist because they value personal freedom and limited government interference in daily personal matters whereas democrats can be seen as more collectivist because they value greater government intervention in economics affairs and a balance between orderly society and liberty. When looking at the difference between mask compliance in democrats and republicans, a striking difference is revealed. Democratically leaning Americans, aligned with collectivist values, have a higher mask-compliance rate than republican leaning counterparts, aligned with more individualist values, have a lower rate of mask compliance (Xu & Cheng, 2020).

To conclude, it is crucial to note that lower mask compliance rates in the United States is not because of Americans being defiant against preventative behaviors, but because of contrasting belief systems and pandemic unpredictability. These findings do not suggest that Americans are associated with various personality traits but instead shed light on the distinct cultural norms affecting behavior.

Psychological Factors

Personal Freedom and Surveillance

Psychological factors, supported by an individualist and collectivist mindset, can also influence mask wearing behavior. The first factor is the idea of personal surveillance. Collectivists are more likely to agree that groups can intrude on an individual’s privacy, especially if it’s for the greater good, since collectivists are more likely to sacrifice their personal freedom for the collective (Bellman et al., 2004). Individualist cultures are more likely to put themselves before the collective to protect their personal freedom, a value that the nation was founded on. This can be seen through the reactions that Americans had towards tracking devices. Before the pandemic, tech companies shared consumer location data with the government to make it easier to track the location of Americans. According to results from a survey in December 2020 conducted on American adults, 42% of the men who responded and 52% of women who responded were very uncomfortable with this (Johnson, 2020). During the pandemic, other companies, such as Google and Apple, used consumer data to track potential exposure to COVID-19. Over 60% of US adults found this COVID-19 exposure tracking tool to be very or somewhat concerning for their privacy (Johnson, 2020).

In South Korea, a collectivist country, government surveillance and tracking has been implemented even before the pandemic. For example, the government has access to credit and bank transaction records to prevent fraud. This system was then repurposed during the pandemic to track where people went, from restaurants to subways. Additionally, because 95% of adults own a smartphone, data location, which was originally used in criminal investigations, is now used for contact tracing. Surveillance footage utilized for investigative purposes and can now provide real time, to the minute, tracking of someone’s location. Koreans can also get sent text messages for outbreak updates. The use of South Korea’s established government surveillance network made it easier to ensure public health safety. Even though there was some talk about privacy concerns, there are limited reports on noncompliance, emphasizing the collectivist tendency to allow personal surveillance for public health purposes (Fendos, 2020).

Risk Attitude

Risk attitude is another psychological factor that affects mask wearing and can be explained through the individualist vs. collectivist mindset. Recent studies show that risk aversion, defined as less likely to engage in risky behaviors, was correlated with compliance to engage in protective behaviors during the pandemic. This was not only true in a pandemic setting but in general, with individuals that have higher levels of risk aversion less likely to smoke or engage in heavy drinking. (Xu & Cheng, 2021).

During a study conducted on Italians, results revealed that emerging adults were more concerned with their relatives and other individuals/community members contracting COVID-19, potentially through them being an asymptomatic carrier, than testing positive for COVID-19 themselves. This collectivist mindset was correlated with a higher perceived risk of infection (Germani et al., 2020). This perceived risk was positively associated with engaging in protective behaviors such as mask wearing and social distancing, a US study found (Duong et al., 2021).

Mask-wearing behavior has similarly been observed and studied in many Asian countries, including Taiwan’s long-standing cultural norm of wearing surgical masks when experiencing symptoms, such as a sore throat and runny nose, as a means to protect others, mentioned earlier (Jennings, 2021).The collectivist mindset and risk perception associated with mask-wearing in different regions can help to support the reasoning behind the Taiwanese mask compliance.

Additionally, as said earlier, amongst the Americans that report not wearing masks, 64% of those Americans said that they didn’t wear a mask because it was uncomfortable or that it’s their right as an American to choose not to wear a mask (Vargas & Sanchez, 2020). An individualist mindset provides reason for these attitudes and behaviors present in some individuals.

Sensitivity Towards Social Norms

The Taiwanese have strong responsiveness to social norms. There is a sense of pressure for wearing masks in subways and public areas. The community will also shame those for non-compliance. For instance, this mentality towards social norms is epitomized in what one Taiwanese said in a CNBC article, “We have this phrase in Taiwan that roughly translates to, ‘This is your country, and it’s up to you to save it’” (Farr, 2020).The government policies also add to this, with hefty fines, up to $500, for non-compliance (Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.; Ministry of Health and Welfare, n.d.).

These distinctions can again be supported by an individualist vs. collectivist mindset, in terms of emotional reactions. For example, one study conducted by Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer, and Wallbott (1988) found that Americans and Japanese experienced similar emotional reactions but Americans experienced emotions longer, with greater intensity and more bodily symptoms such as verbal reactions, lumps in the throat, breath changes. To conclude the study, more Japanese agreed that acting on these events when coping with these emotional situations was unnecessary, showing a weaker association between emotion and behavior (Scherer, Matsumoto, Wallbot, & Kudoh, 1988). The findings can be expanded out and offer an explanation to how individualists vs. collectivists in the US and Taiwan behaved in mask compliance. The Taiwanese held each other accountable and were less likely to act on their emotions if they didn’t fully agree/want to wear a mask. Americans were more likely to act and go against these mandates, as can be seen through countless protests across many states, even if they had felt similar levels of emotion towards masks as some Taiwanese did.

One of the possible explanations for this is that many of the emotions experienced are ego-focused emotions, meaning they mainly concern the individual’s internal attributes or characteristics. Some examples include anger, frustration, and pride. Therefore, it is logical that individualists are more likely to attend to and act on these emotions than collectivists are, say if they feel their personal freedom is being violated, because these ego-focused emotions are at the heart of an independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Through the exploration of how psychological factors influenced mask compliance, the prevalence of an individualist vs. collectivist mindset underscores the application to attitudes and behaviors.

Differences in Diversity among Populations

The United States has great diversity with Americans having their own distinct identity, from various demographics, gender, race, ethnicity, and social groups. The United States is rapidly becoming more complex, with data estimates from the US Census Bureau showing that nearly 4 of 10 Americans identify with a race or ethnic group other than white (Frey, 2020; US Census Bureau, 2021). Some Americans then form subgroups with those of similar demographic identities, and base social behavior off of their beliefs and backgrounds.

One way of measuring ethnic diversity is based on an analysis of ethnic fractionalization, the probability that two random individuals from the same country are not from the same group (race, ethnicity, or other criteria). This can be done through Fearon’s analysis in which ethnic fractionalization is on a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most ethnically diverse. When comparing the numbers on Fearon’s analysis, the United States is 0.49 and Taiwan is 0.274 (Alesina et al., 2002; Fisher, 2019).

Diversity is a descriptive factor in the individualist vs. collectivist mindset, with individualism associated with more heterogeneous cultures and collectivism associated with more homogeneous cultures. This diversity in mindset can explain why some states have higher mask compliance rates, as mentioned in the “Collectivism Predicts Mask Wearing” section (Lu et al., 2021).

]From a racial perspective, in a study conducted by USC, the group that was least likely to consistently wear a mask when in close contact with non-household members were whites, with a compliance rate of 46%. Compared to whites, other races including latinos, blacks, and others had higher compliance rates with 63%, 67%, and 65%, respectively (Key, 2021). Diversity in all demographics, from race, locale, and ethnicity, had significant contributions the way individualists and collectivists engaged in mask wearing. This emphasizes the dynamic intricacies of various societies in which no single factor can predict mask wearing.

Conclusion

Culture is an important factor in behavior that has intrigued me as someone who is mixed and spends time with those of various ethnicities, races, and social groups. When the pandemic hit, I spoke to many family and friends that had completely different views on how the virus affected them and what appropriate measures they believed should be taken. At times it was overwhelming and I sought to understand if there was an underlying cultural factor at the root of different attitudes and behaviors. I found that my relatives in Taiwan had one of the most striking contrasts compared to my relatives in the United States in the way they viewed how the government and our societies should be responding.

Since the onset of the pandemic, the infection and mortality rates have been significantly higher in the United States: the US infection rate is about 200 times that of Taiwan and the US mortality rate is about 60 times that of Taiwan (Ritchie et al., 2020). I chose mask wearing as my control factor because it is a universal way to lower the rate of transmission. From talking with my family and friends, I observed that mask-wearing was one of the most heavily debated topics.

The mask compliance rates are significantly higher in Taiwan than in the United States. Through my literature search, I found multiple demographic, cultural, and psychological factors, influenced by an individualist vs. collectivist mindset, that predicted mask wearing. Taiwan’s proximal distance to SARS in 2003 resulted in public health regulations that gave public health agencies access to patient medical and travel records for contact tracing and testing. Along with this, Eastern countries have norms for wearing masks to protect others. Race, locale, and political ideology was associated with mask wearing. Psychological factors involving higher risk attitude, sensitivity to social norms, and personal surveillance compliance were affected by a collectivist mindset. As a caveat, individualism tends to be correlated with Western countries but there is still a large percentage of Americans that do not associate with an individualist mindset. This results in greater diversity within the United States and Americans having differing views of cultural beliefs. Further, Taiwan’s cultural norms and policy preparedness proved to be significant in Taiwanese compliance with preventative measures.

At the heart of a collectivist is having compassion and taking in another perspective by wearing a mask to protect others. On the other hand, a reason individualists are not complying with mask mandates is not because of pure defiance but because they have a different belief system. For instance, for some individualists, it may be harder to conceptualize that they’re part of a collective and that their individual behavior is affecting the group.

These findings are important because it provides insights into how people react to governmental health regulations during times of uncertainty. Neither individualists nor collectivists are “better” than the other. There are specific attributes of each that may better serve during specific circumstances, such as a global health crisis, but I am not stereotyping individualists or collectivists with specific personality traits. I am not here to convince anyone to change their belief system but in global health crises it may be useful to adopt more collectivist actions while also taking steps to protect themselves. This can be achieved without taking away key components of identity and protecting personal values. One big question is how can we get people to comply without making them change their belief systems?

This paper explores the reasons behind noncompliance, so we can get insight into how to frame compliance requests for individualists and collectivists in different manners with the goal of showing that mask-wearing benefits the health of the public. For collectivists, explaining how mask-wearing benefits the group. Ironically, individualists that are not complying with mask mandates are presenting potential health risks to themselves and the group; these individuals are more likely valuing personal freedom over health. When framing compliance requests for individualists, it may help to emphasize that wearing masks acts in their own interests as well as establish the link between individual behavior and group health. These changes in reframing requests appeal to the individualist and collectivist belief systems while respecting personal values.

It is also important to note that extreme collectivism and extreme individualism can also harm self-interest. To further illustrate, extreme collectivism is primarily not taking into account individual needs and extreme individualism is solely focused on personal desires. Neither of these extremes act in one’s best interest because it fails to take into account other perspectives and people.

To conclude, in everyday experiences, it’s good to find some common ground. That way different perspectives can be acknowledged to create a more informed and dynamic view of the world. Sometimes it’s better to be an individual, sometimes it’s better to be a collectivist. In general, it’s hard to change belief systems to adopt other views but being able to empathize and understand why people are the way they are is beneficial not only in a pandemic, but in daily life.

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About the author

Alena Powell

Alena is a senior at Avenues: The World School in NYC. She is passionate about the social sciences, public policy, and global/cultural studies. Her academic interests are interdisciplinary and experiential as she hopes to continue immersion in different cultures, learning about various economic and government systems, and explore pathways to apply her knowledge through social impact.

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