The Complex Role of Antisemitism in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Introduction

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has its roots in historical, political, and cultural tensions that date back centuries, but the modern phase of the conflict began in 2014. Following the Euromaidan protests and the ousting of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, Russia annexed Crimea, a move widely condemned by the international community. This act of aggression was followed by the outbreak of a pro-Russian separatist insurgency in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, leading to a war that has caused significant loss of life and displacement. The conflict has seen direct and indirect Russian military involvement, with Russia providing support to the separatists while denying official engagement. The situation escalated dramatically in February of 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, citing the need to “demilitarize and de-Nazify” the country—a justification dismissed by Ukraine and much of the international community as illegitimate. The invasion has resulted in many casualties, a humanitarian crisis, and severe economic and political repercussions, not only for Ukraine and Russia but for the broader global community. The war has also intensified existing ethnic and national tensions, including a resurgence of antisemitism, as nationalist rhetoric and propaganda have become tools in the geopolitical struggle. 

Antisemitism is hardly a new phenomenon in Ukraine or Russia. Yet, since the annexation of Crimea in early 2014, antisemitism has become important in the way both sides justify their involvement in the war. Taking the annexation as a starting point, this paper will examine the Ukrainian and Russian governments’ engagement with antisemitism in the course of the Ukraine War through the present day. Both countries have claimed that they are fighting antisemitism to justify their actions in the war. Yet, it is striking that there are antisemitic elements on both sides. This paper will investigate the tension between the claims by Russia and Ukraine that they are combating antisemitism, and the fact that, in different ways, antisemitism is a prominent and influential force in the politics of both countries. It will highlight the existence of antisemitic tropes and prejudices on both sides of the conflict. However, the paper will show that antisemitism plays a much more important role in Russia’s justification of the conflict, than in Ukraine’s rationale for defending itself. Russia has instrumentalized antisemitism, by promoting conspiracy theories about Jews and by tolerating and even encouraging antisemitic statements and behavior within the Russian Federation. Ukraine, by contrast, has witnessed less overt forms of antisemitism which the government has disavowed, in particular through its steadfast support of Israel after the October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks by Hamas. Therefore, the distinction between Russia and Ukraine is not as simple as one may initially believe. Both parties to the conflict have certain levels of antisemitism in their politics, yet it is Russia that has embraced that antisemitism as a central justification for its war on Ukraine. 

This paper will proceed in three parts. First, it will examine the relatively marginal manifestations of antisemitism on the Ukrainian side during the war, and show how the Ukrainian government has managed to limit antisemitism despite the long history of persecution of Jews in the country. The second section will turn to Russia. It will argue that, far from managing or muting antisemitism, the Russian government has actually used it to justify the war, targeting Jews in the process. The third section will attempt to provide an explanation for why antisemetism looks so differently on both sides of the conflict. It will argue that a major reason for the sharp contrast between the Ukrainian and Russian governments’ attitude towards antisemitism is that they have very different global audiences, leading to different stances regarding Jewish people. To place this analysis in proper context, the paper will first turn to the historical background of the Ukraine War. 

Ukraine and Russia: an uneasy relationship 

Although it may seem that the war in Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, it really started 8 years earlier on February 20, 2014, with the annexation of Crimea. Historically, Crimea was a key part of Russian culture until 1954 when it was handed to the Ukraine SSR. Most Russians believe that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia due to its primarily Russian population and cultural significance. Most importantly, however, Crimea holds significant strategic importance within the black sea. The peninsula hosts the port of Sevastopol, a crucial navy base that is home to Russia’s black sea fleet. Furthermore, Crimea’s central positioning within the black sea allows Russia to have increased access to the region and limits Ukraine’s trade and military capabilities. It is for these reasons that Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and established control over the territory. 

In addition to Crimea, the Donbas region (comprising the Luhansk and Donetsk region) has also seen a multitude of tension over the last decade. In February of 2014, after the Euromaidan protests and the establishment of a new government, pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine declared independence from Ukraine, leading to the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). Russia backed the separatists with military, economic, and political aid. The Ukrainian government responded with military action, leading to an ongoing conflict that has resulted in thousands of deaths and significant displacement of civilians. The war in Donbas has been characterized by heavy fighting, artillery exchanges, and significant destruction of infrastructure.The Donbas region is of significant geopolitical and strategic importance to both Ukraine and Russia. For Ukraine, retaining control over Donetsk and Luhansk is essential for maintaining national integrity and political stability. The region’s industrial capabilities and economic contributions are crucial to Ukraine’s economy.  For Russia, backing the separatists in Donbas serves multiple strategic objectives. It establishes a buffer zone against NATO’s eastward expansion and applies pressure on the Ukrainian government. Additionally, the conflict enables Russia to sustain its influence in Ukraine and hinder its full integration with Western institutions like the European Union and NATO. 

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, marked a significant escalation of the conflict that had been simmering since 2014. This invasion was characterized by coordinated attacks on multiple fronts, targeting key cities and infrastructure across Ukraine, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol. The assault was part of a broader strategy to overthrow the Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian regime, although such goals have met with considerable resistance and international condemnation. In the Donbas region, the conflict has intensified, with heavy fighting continuing in cities like Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk. Furthermore, Crimea has played a crucial role in Russia’s war efforts. Although Ukraine has been able to limit Russia’s marine capabilities, Crimea still offers key supply lines for Russia to be able to support the frontlines in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. 

Over the past two years, the war has reached a gradual stalemate. Despite some impressive successes in the early Russian advance, accompanied by atrocities against the Ukrainian population, the American-armed Ukrainian Army has waged a war of attrition against the Russians. According to one estimate from 2023, the Russian has suffered around 300,000 casualties, including at least 120,000 killed (“Russia Suffers” 2024). These numbers are significantly greater than Ukrainian losses, which include over 100,000 wounded and 70,000 killed, with over 10,000 Ukrainian civilians killed (Grainger 2024). The path that the war will take will likely depend on the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. However, it is  assumed that, in any case, Russia will permanently annex significant parts of eastern Ukraine. It is also clear that Russia will not be able to completely occupy Ukraine. A future peace deal might require a demilitarized Ukraine, but so far the Ukrainian government has refused to even consider such an option. The uncertainty of where the war will go creates a climate conducive to the spread of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, which have found fertile ground in this part of the world for centuries. 

Ukraine 

Antisemitism has deep historical roots in Ukraine, marked by pogroms, discrimination, and violence against Jewish communities. However, in recent times—especially since the Euromaidan protests and changes in government—Ukraine has actively addressed and fought against antisemitism, diverging from its troubled past. 

Ukraine’s commitment towards the fight against antisemitism is exemplified through their Jewish president, Voldymyr Zelensky. Elected in 2019, Zelensky’s leadership marks a significant shift in a country with a deep history of Jewish hate. His presidency symbolizes Ukraine’s move towards inclusivity and tolerance, while at the same time countering deeply ingrained prejudices. Zelensky has been praised for his defiance against Russia, particularly as a Jewish leader. Nathan Sharansky, who spent years in a Soviet Gulag accused of treason for seeking permission to move to Israel, noted that Zelensky is part of a long tradition of Jews in eastern European history who faced death for standing up to autocracy, but said the Ukrainian president’s Judaism may prove to have broader implications, including as a counter to rising anti-Semitism. He said, “This unique role Zelensky is playing in uniting the Ukrainian nation, without hiding his Jewish identity, I think it can definitely help to overcome many prejudices.” The Jewish Telegraph Agency, the 100-year-old news wire covering Jewish affairs, said Zelensky’s “leadership is resonating… with Jews the world over” – citing several Jewish writers celebrating his resistance to an invading army. “As a Jew, it is impossible not to feel proud of the courage, dignity, and defiance shown by Zelensky at this moment,” Molly Crabapple, a prominent writer who has contributed to the New Yorker magazine and the New York Times, said. Zelensky’s prominence and resilience as a Jewish leader shows Ukraine’s progress in aligning with the West and combating antisemitism (“Zelensky Invokes” 2022). 

Ukraine’s pivot towards Western integration has been supplemented by their efforts to realign its policies and norms with those of the European Union and United States. This reorientation is exemplified through legislative measures targeting antisemitism and hatred on Jewish people. For example, on October 7, 2021, Zelensky passed a law that banned antisemitism, in which they defined antisemitism as the hatred of Jews. They said this hatred included attacks directly at Jews as well as their property, religious buildings, or communities. The punishment for antisemitism could be up to eight years in jail. In September, when the first law passed, Jewish Confederation of Ukraine President Boris Lozhkin stated that it “brought Ukraine closer to Europe and the civilized world.” He added, “Together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the JCU has been conducting joint monitoring of manifestations of antisemitism for a long time, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs promptly responds to all cases of physical or online antisemitism (Harkov 2022).” 

While the leadership of a Jewish president and these legislative efforts demonstrate significant progress, the ongoing veneration of antisemitic historical figures and the presence of extremist groups reveal the complexities and challenges Ukraine faces in fully eradicating antisemitism from its society. Symon Petliura, was a leader of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) during World War I and the Russian Civil War. He remains a controversial figure in Ukrainian history, as his leadership coincided with a period of intense antisemitic violence, including the Proskurov pogrom in 1919, where a UPR army detachment massacred around 1,500 Jews. These pogroms, often justified by the false accusation of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” marked some of the bloodiest episodes of the Russian Civil War, as over 50,000 Jews were murdered in these pogroms. Although Petliura didn’t directly order the commencement of the pogroms, he expressed views that suggested Jews had brought the violence upon themselves by not supporting the UPR. In 1926, Petliura was assassinated in Paris by Sholem Schwarzbard, a Jewish anarchist, in retaliation for the pogroms. Schwarzbard’s trial highlighted the debate over Petliura’s responsibility, with the jury acquitting Schwarzbard, viewing his act as a crime of passion (Gilley 2019). On May 25, 2016, Ukraine observed a minute of silence, to commemorate Petliura on the 90th anniversary of his assassination. This minute of silence included national television channels interrupting their pogrom to show a burning candle for 60 seconds (“Ukraine Honors” 2016). 

Petliura is not the only controversial historical figure that Ukraine has recently honored. In 1939, Stepan Bandera became leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a militant nationalist group advocating for Ukrainian independence from Poland and the Soviet Union. He was a Ukrainian nationalist who declared Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in Lviv on June 30, 1941, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Fighting alongside Germany against the Red Army, the OUN committed countless atrocities towards Jews under Bandera’s leadership. The OUN was responsible for many pogroms and acts of violence targeting Jews during and after WWII. On July 7, 2016, Kyiv renamed a major street to honor the Nazi collaborator. Furthermore, in 2024 Ukraine designated every January 1 as a national holiday in order to honor Bandera on his birthday. For decades hundreds of Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv to march in honor of Bandera and his nationalist ideology, further disregarding the antisemitic violence that he led (“Hundreds of Ukrainians” 2022). 

Jewish organizations such as the World Jewish Congress (JWC) and The Times of Israel have heavily criticized Ukraine’s commemoration of these historical figures. While speaking about Petliura, WJC CEO and executive vice president Robert Singer said, “It is inconceivable that a man, who today we would not hesitate to call a terrorist, should be honored in the very same city in which he and his regime tried to wipe out a rooted and strong Jewish population (“WJC Denounces” 2017).” Putin and the Russian government have used Ukraine’s celebration of these historical figures as a tool for propaganda in which they portray Ukraine as “nazis”. Jeffrey Veidlinger, a professor of history and Judaic studies at the University of Michigan, said, “There is a history of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis, and Putin is trying to build upon that history.” 

Lastly, the Azov Battalion, a unit of the Ukrainian National Guard, has garnered significant controversy due to its association with far-right ideology and allegations of antisemitism. Formed in 2014 as a volunteer militia to fight pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region, the battalion was later incorporated into the Ukrainian National Guard. It has been criticized for attracting neo-Nazi sympathizers and using symbols linked to Nazi Germany. Members of the Azov Battalion have been accused of making antisemitic remarks and displaying far-right symbols. In 2010, the battalion’s first commander and a former Ukrainian parliamentarian, Andriy Biletsky, said he believed Ukraine’s national purpose should be to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade … against Semite-led Untermenschen [subhumans].” 

However, the Ukrainian government has taken steps to distance itself from these elements and integrate the battalion within its formal military structure to exert greater control. They have made it clear that the Azov Brigade does not represent the entire Ukrainian military and the morals of the country. The brigade has countered perceptions that claim that they are anti-Jewish. For example, in an open letter to the Russian people, the members of the Azov Brigade wrote: that “this unit is made up of Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Greeks, Georgians, Crimean Tatars and Belarusians. Soldiers of different faiths have been serving hand in hand in this unit for 8 years: Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, pagans, Jews and Muslims. Where the majority speaks Russian (Lisitsyn 2022).” This and other public-facing appeals represented an attempt to counter media coverage of past antisemitic statements from the Brigade’s members. Despite these efforts, the presence of the Azov Battalion remains a point of contention and is frequently cited in Russian propaganda to portray Ukraine as harboring fascist and antisemitic elements. In August of 2022, the Russian supreme court labeled the Azov Battalion as a “foreign terrorist organization” (“Profile: Who Are Ukraine’s” 2022). The Azov battalion gives Russia an opportunity to deflect accusations of antisemitism and exaggerate the importance of this small unit, which consists of 1500-7000 members (Ourdan 2022). 

It is evident that although Ukraine has a history of commemorating antisemetic figures and incorporating antisemitic soldiers into their military. Nevertheless, the analysis above demonstrates that the Ukrainian government is heavily invested in portraying itself as struggling against antisemitism. The government, including Zelensky who is Jewish, are actively trying to  combat antisemitism, while Russia is using Ukraine’s honoring of antisemitic figures and Azov battalion to promote propaganda justifying their claims of “denazification”.
Russia 

In stark contrast to Ukraine, where antisemitism has been largely relegated to the fringes of political and military discourse, Russia has deliberately used antisemitism as a key part of its justification for the conflict. From the start of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin framed the invasion as a mission to “denazify” Ukraine—a narrative deeply intertwined with antisemitic conspiracy theories that have long been a feature of Russian political rhetoric. 

Russian leaders have been very vocal in their criticism of President Zelensky, and specifically the fact that he is Jewish. On August 29, 2023, in an interview with Russian propagandist Pavel Zarubin, Putin argued that “Western managers put an ethnic Jew in charge” in order to “cover up the anti-human nature of modern Ukraine (Poluektova-Krimer 2024, 77).” This very antisemitic statement is one of many to come from Russia’s top leading officials. In an interview with Italian news channel Zona Bianca, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was asked how Russian President Vladimir Putin could claim he was trying to “denazify” Ukraine when Volodymyr Zelensky was Jewish. Lavrov responded by saying, “So what if Zelensky is Jewish. The fact does not negate the Nazi elements in Ukraine. I believe that Hitler also had Jewish blood,” Lavrov said, adding that “some of the worst antisemites are Jews (“Lavrov: So What” 2022).” This is another example of a Russian leader justifying their war in Ukraine by saying they are combating antisemitism, while they themselves are using antisemitic language. 

Another way that Russia has used antisemetism to justify the war in Ukraine is by claiming that the Ukrainian regime, as well as Western sanctions imposed upon them, are antisemitic ways of targeting Russia. By this reasoning, the “Nazi”, the anti-Semite, and the “aggressor” are always portrayed as the other, while Russia increasingly seeks to position itself as the primary victim. This idea is encapsulated in the popular phrase, “Russians are the new Jews.” This has coined the term “Russophobia”, which has been associated with antisemitism. 

For example, in 2017, when questioned by Megyn Kelly about Russia’s potential interference in the 2016 US elections, Putin compared these accusations to antisemitism. Putin said, “When one is stupid and inept then the Jews are always to blame. We know what such attitudes lead to: nothing good can come out of it.” In 2022, he again explained that avalanches of Western sanctions against Russia are antisemitic attacks. Putin said, “The West dropped its mask of civility and began to act belligerently. It begs a comparison to the anti-Semitic pogroms in fascist Germany (Poluektova-Krimer 2024, 77).” 

The Russian public resonated deeply with the equation of antisemitism and “Russophobia”. Many were eager to portray Russia as the main victim of both the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. This sentiment was echoed in the rock band “Leningrad’s” song titled “Входа нет” (“No Entry”), where the lead singer condemned a “genocide unleashed against the Russians,” claiming that Europeans now view Russians as the new “zhyd” (a derogatory term for Jews), deserving to be “burnt in a furnace.” The accompanying music video featured dancers in Russian folk attire with large Jewish stars sewn onto their chests. Leningrad is a popular band in Russia that also allied itself to the Russian state since the invasion of Ukraine. For example, in 2023 the band produced a song called “Rostec” praising the Russian military conglomerate of that name; the accompanying clip included Sergei Chemazov, Rostev’s head (Kiselev 2023). In the spring and summer of 2022, discussions on Russian-language social media about EU travel restrictions drew parallels between Russians struggling to obtain EU visas and Jewish refugees aboard the MS St. Louis, fleeing Nazi persecution in 1939. These comparisons echoed Kremlin-led narratives, which aim to undermine the historical perspectives and security concerns of Poland and the Baltic states by invoking wartime collaboration in the persecution of Jews (Poluektova-Krimer 2024, 77). This shows how the Russian government has used antisemitism as a way of defending itself, while justifying its actions against Ukraine and the West. 

In addition to saying Western sanctions and the Ukrainian regime are antisemitic towards Russia, Putin and other government officials have also blamed the anti-Jewish riots in Dagestan on the Ukrainian government. A series of violent incidents took place in the Republic of Dagestan, a region in the North Caucasus of Russia, in late October 2023. These events were sparked by the arrival of a plane from Israel at Makhachkala airport, which led to a mob of people storming the airport in search of Jewish passengers. The riots were driven by antisemitic sentiment and misinformation, with some attackers believing that the plane carried Israeli refugees fleeing the conflict between Israel and Hamas, which had escalated significantly in October 2023. The violence at Makhachkala airport was marked by alarming scenes of rioters chanting antisemitic slogans, demanding to know the identities of Jewish passengers, and violently attempting to break into secure areas of the airport. Several individuals were injured in the chaos, and flights were temporarily suspended as the authorities struggled to regain control. The rioters also took to the streets, leading to further clashes with security forces (Rosenberg 2024). 

Following the attack, Russia’s foreign affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said, “The criminal Kyiv regime played a direct and key role in carrying out the latest destructive act.” Dagestan’s governor Sergei Melikov specifically blamed an influential social media channel he said was run by “traitors” working from Ukraine for fuelling the unrest. On October 30, 2023, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters, “Yesterday’s events at Makhachkala airport are, to a large extent, the result of external interference (“Russia Blames” 2023).” These assertions by Russian officials illustrate the extent to which Russia has manipulated narratives and spread misinformation to vilify Ukraine and rationalize its war under false pretenses. 

Furthermore, Russia has deliberately linked Jews with the anti-war movement as part of a broader strategy to vilify dissent and justify its actions in Ukraine. This association draws on deep-seated antisemitic tropes, casting Jews as part of a “fifth column”—a term historically used to describe traitors within a nation. In Russia, this label is applied to liberals who oppose the war, portraying them as disloyal to the state. Elena Berkovich, a prominent anti-war figure, exemplifies how the state has weaponized these narratives. Berkovich, who is Jewish and has taken a strong anti-war stance, has been portrayed as a traitor in both official media and public opinion. This is part of a broader pattern where liberal figures of Jewish origin have been targeted in public scandals, often with impunity. In 2012, ultra-nationalist writer Zakhar Prilepin penned a letter sarcastically crediting Stalin with “slay[ing] seven layers of Russians” in order to “save” an unspecified “tribe,” almost certainly referring to Jewish victims of the Holocaust. This was a clear antisemitic attack that did not damage Prilpein’s career, but rather boosted it (Poluektova-Krimer 2024, 79). 

The example of Prilepin demonstrates that writers and public personalities can engage in antisemitic stereotyping without any fear of reprisal or negative consequences for their careers. In fact, often these antisemitic comments appear to be a boon for the people spreading them. For example, in 2013, when opposition journalist Leonid Gozman criticized the Russian military, a tabloid writer responded with a horrifying statement lamenting that Nazis hadn’t turned the ancestors of today’s liberals into lampshades. This statement, though later edited, went viral, and the writer faced no repercussions. Such rhetoric was visually reinforced in 2014 when a Moscow bookstore displayed a poster labeling opposition figures, including Jewish ones, as members of a “fifth column”. This narrative has continued in recent years, with Putin himself mocking Jewish figures like Arkady Volozh and Anatoly Chubais, who relocated to Israel, suggesting they have turned against Russia to ingratiate themselves with Israeli authorities. Russian propagandists have echoed this sentiment, accusing Jewish celebrities who oppose the war and emigrate to Israel of hypocrisy. By equating Jewish identity with liberal opposition to the war, the Kremlin aims to delegitimize dissent and foster suspicion. This strategy not only targets Jews but also reinforces the idea that any opposition to the war is inherently traitorous, deserving of scorn and punishment (Poluektova-Krimer 2024, 80). Russia’s association of Jews with the anti-war movement is thus a calculated effort to isolate and discredit opposers while justifying its actions in Ukraine. 

It is evident that Russia’s claims to “denazify” Ukraine, through discrediting Zelensky and the Ukrainian government’s stance on antisemitism, are not supported by their track record of expressing antisemitic tropes and not punishing antisemitic stereotyping committed by prominent Russian personalities. Also, the misinformation that Russian leaders have spread, including “Russophobia” and blaming Ukraine on the antisemitic attacks in Dagestan, has discredited Russia’s justification for the war. This behavior demonstrates that, while the Russian state maintains a pretense of resisting antisemitism, in fact it has instrumentalized conspiracy theories about Jews to rationalize its conduct of the Ukraine War. 

Point of Comparison: Gaza 

Russia and Ukraine’s responses to the Israel-Hamas war raises further questions about how Russia’s claims of “denazification” could be true. In the context of the Israel-Hamas war, Russia has aligned itself with Palestine and Iran. By aligning itself with anti-Israel narratives Russia seeks to maintain influence over these key regional players. This alignment is not without consequence; it has the effect of normalizing or even amplifying antisemitic sentiments, which serve to destabilize the region and fuel ongoing conflict. The goal is not to decide whether Russia’s condemnation of Israel for its attacks on Palestine are antisemitic or not. However, Russia’s alignment with countries such as Iran, Lebanon, and countries in Africa, raises questions about the underlying motivation and consequences of these alliances. 

For example, following the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, for three days, Putin remained silent about the conflict, offering no condolences to Tel Aviv and refraining from calling Netanyahu, despite reports of at least four Russian nationals killed and six more missing. Russia’s stance during this period also hindered the United Nations Security Council from reaching the unanimity needed to condemn Hamas. Finally, on Tuesday, Putin broke his silence—not to express sympathy for the victims, but to denounce the “catastrophic” civilian deaths and criticize Washington’s actions in the Middle East peace process. “This is a vivid example of the failure of Middle East policies of the United States, as it tried to monopolize the [peace] settlement,” he declared during a televised meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. This hesitation can be seen as part of Russia’s broader geopolitical strategy, where it prioritizes its relationships with Middle Eastern actors, such as Iran and Syria, over traditional diplomatic norms, such as condemning terrorism. Even on April 18, 2024, Russia called on the United Nations to sanction Israel for its actions in Gaza. It’s clear that Russia’s foreign policy maneuvers often align with existing antisemitic sentiments, particularly when such actions serve Russia’s broader geopolitical interests. 

On the other hand, Ukraine showed solidarity with Israel following the attack. On October 7, 2023, President Zelensky stated, “Wherever they aim their missiles and whomever they attack, terrorists must lose. And this is important for the whole world.” Furthermore, on that date the Ukrainian foreign ministry said it “strongly condemns the ongoing terrorist attacks against Israel, including rocket attacks against the civilian population in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.”Following the October 7 attack, Russia has sided with Palestine, while Ukraine has sided with Israel. The reasons for these alliances are quite straightforward. Ukraine relies on aid sent from Israel, while Russia aligns itself with countries fighting against the West. However, this questions how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be a “denazification” operation, while Ukraine clearly supports a Jewish state and Russia is opposing it. 

Yet, the Ukrainian position is not as clear-cut, or morally rigid, in favor of Israel, as it might at first seem. This underscores the fact that Ukraine, like Russia, views the Gaza War primarily in terms of bolstering its image to a global audience. Unlike Russia, which mainly has in mind the Global South, Ukrainian politicians want to curry favor in the eyes of Western elites that are backing them in the conflict with Russia. Whatever the true beliefs concerning the Gaza War of the Ukrainian administration and population, ultimately the decision of whether to side with Israel, or criticize its actions, is a political one. Statements of support for Israel have succeeded in generating enthusiasm for Ukraine in some quarters of American politics, especially on the right wing. Notably, advocacy groups invested in unequivocal American support for Israel have vocally come to Ukraine’s defense (Rayman, 2023). Some right-wing intellectuals have characterized the Ukrainian and Gaza Wars as a united struggle for the soul of Western civilization, a framing that clearly benefits the Ukrainian case for continued Western support (Ferguson 2024). Yet as the war has dragged on, and Israel has become more isolated  even in the West, the Ukrainians have tempered somewhat. They abstained from the May 10, 2024 UN Resolution backing Palestine’s full membership in the UN (“UN Backs” 2024). A month later, at a press conference in Singapore, President Zelensky was much more muted in supporting Israel. “We must respect international law,” he told journalists. “Ukraine recognizes two states, both Israel and Palestine, and will do everything it can to convince Israel to stop, to end this conflict and prevent the suffering of civilians (Fornusek 2024).” Ukraine is therefore echoing, however indirectly, the rhetoric of its arch-rival Russia on the legality and humanity of the Gaza War. This suggests that Ukrainian support for Israel is not absolute. Rather than being based on a moral commitment to fighting antisemitism, it is primarily intended to amplify Ukraine’s image to a global audience. 

It’s essential to understand how the contrasting stances of Russia and Ukraine on the Israel-Hamas conflict reveal deeper layers of their geopolitical strategies and the role of antisemitism in their narratives. Russia’s alignment with Palestine, Iran, and other actors opposing Israel highlights a broader agenda of challenging Western influence and maintaining ties with anti-Western nations. This, in turn, contradicts Russia’s purported goal of “denazification” in Ukraine, as it finds itself allied with forces often associated with antisemitic rhetoric. 

On the other hand, Ukraine’s initial support for Israel, followed by a more cautious stance, underscores its need to align with Western powers while navigating complex global dynamics. Ukraine’s positioning on the Gaza War is less about a firm moral stance against antisemitism and more about securing its place within the Western political sphere, which is crucial for its ongoing conflict with Russia. The shifts in Ukrainian rhetoric as the Gaza conflict progresses show that its support for Israel is not absolute but rather a calculated move to maintain favor with its Western allies. 

These dynamics are crucial in understanding the broader context of the war in Ukraine. The way both Russia and Ukraine position themselves in the Israel-Hamas conflict reflects their broader strategies in the global arena and demonstrates how antisemitism and narratives around it are not merely domestic issues but integral to their international identities and justifications for their actions. This intersection of regional conflicts with global geopolitics sheds light on the complex motivations behind the war in Ukraine, where issues like antisemitism are weaponized for broader strategic purposes. 

Conclusion 

The complex interplay between Ukraine and Russia, marked by historical grievances, strategic interests, and deeply ingrained cultural narratives, has fueled a conflict that extends far beyond mere territorial disputes. This war, which escalated dramatically in 2022 but has roots dating back to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, is as much about competing national identities and geopolitical alignments as it is about control over land and resources. Crimea’s significance to both Russia and Ukraine exemplifies the strategic and symbolic battleground that this conflict has become, with each side seeking to assert its sovereignty and historical legitimacy. The Donbas region further complicates this dynamic, serving as both a flashpoint for ongoing violence and a proxy battleground for larger international tensions, particularly between Russia and the West. 

The role of antisemitism in this conflict adds another layer of complexity, particularly in the ways it has been weaponized by both sides. In Ukraine, the election of a Jewish president and the implementation of laws targeting antisemitism reflect the country’s ongoing efforts to distance itself from its troubled past and align more closely with Western values. However, these efforts are undermined by the continued veneration of controversial historical figures and the presence of far-right elements like the Azov Battalion. This duality within Ukraine’s national narrative has been exploited by Russian propaganda, which seeks to portray the Ukrainian government as fascist, despite its significant steps toward combating antisemitism. 

In contrast, Russia’s use of antisemitism as a rhetorical tool to justify its invasion of Ukraine highlights the cynical manipulation of historical narratives for political gain. By framing the war as a mission to “denazify” Ukraine, Russian leaders have sought to deflect criticism of their own actions while simultaneously perpetuating antisemitic tropes. This narrative not only distorts the reality of the conflict but also serves to rally domestic support by invoking deeply ingrained cultural fears and prejudices. Moreover, Russia’s attempts to equate its own victimization with that of the Jews during the Holocaust reveal the extent to which antisemitism has been repurposed as a weapon in the broader information war surrounding the conflict. 

In conclusion, the war between Ukraine and Russia is not merely a clash of armies but a battle over competing visions of national identity and historical memory. Both countries have engaged with antisemitism in ways that reflect their respective political goals and cultural narratives, with Ukraine striving to overcome its past while Russia manipulates antisemitic rhetoric to bolster its own position. As the conflict continues to evolve, the role of antisemitism—whether as a tool of propaganda or as a genuine social issue—will likely remain a significant and contentious aspect of the broader struggle between these two nations. Ultimately, the resolution of this conflict will require not only a ceasefire on the battlefield but also a reckoning with the historical and cultural forces that have fueled the violence and division for so long. 

Bibliography 

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Fornusek, M. (2024, June 3). Zelensky: Ukraine recognizes both Israel and Palestine, seeks to end suffering of civilians. The Kyiv Independent. 

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